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INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
DOMESTIC RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
L INTRODUCTION 
The pending United States ratification of the 1975 Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration1 
represents a growing willingness by this country to recognize inter-
national commercial agreements. Essentially duplicating the 1958 
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (U.N. Convention),2 the Inter-American 
Convention aims to facilitate the settlement of international com-
mercial disputes3 by binding arbitration.4 The Convention, there-
fore, endeavors to promote uniform recognition and enforcement 
of foreign arbitral agreements and awards by members of the 
Organization of American States (0.A.S.).5 
1. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, done Jan. 
30, 1975, OAS/Ser. A/20 (SEPF); 14 l.L.M. 336 (1975); S. Treaty Doc. No. 97-12, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. 8-19 (1981); S. 1658, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (enacted by 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-307 
(West Supp. 1984)) [hereinafter cited as Inter-American Convention]. 
2. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
done Sept. 30, 1970, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.l.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (effective Dec. 
29, 1970) (enacted by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Convention]. 
3. Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at 1. There is little doubt that arbitra-
tion proceedings in the international arena have increased in both scope and frequency. The 
arbitral process has its roots in the commercial law developed by the trading countries of 
the West. Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 846 (1961). This 
process has expanded steadily throughout the contemporary international commercial area. 
Wetter, The Legal Framework of International Arbitral Tribunals-Five Tentative Mark-
ings, in INT'L CONT. 271, 274 (1981). At present, international commercial arbitration is 
perceived "as a panacea for the ills of court procedural delays, uncertainties, expense, and 
publicity." De Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for 
National Courts, 57 TuL. L. REV. 42, 43 (1982). Thus, international commercial arbitration is 
increasingly utilized by parties unwilling to submit to the "vagaries of [domestic] judicial 
systems." Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 L. & POL'Y INT'L 
Bus. 1191, 1191 (1977). See Lew, The Arbitration Act of 1975, 24 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 870, 878 
(1975). For example, the American Arbitration Association has been asked to administer 101 
international arbitral proceedings involving 34 foreign countries in 1980 alone. Hoellering, 
N.Y.L.J. Arbitration, Aug. 13, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 1. 
4. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 1, at 21-27. 
5. The need to expand the application of the U.N. Convention's primary stipulations 
had become evident by the reluctance of some O.A.S. countries to join this pact. As of 
January 1, 1983, only Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago 
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The judicial policy favoring an expansive construction of the 
U .N. Convention6 will similarly characterize domestic application 
of the Inter-American Convention.7 Legal interpretation of the 
U .N. Convention has somewhat restrained the freedom previously 
allocated to American Multinational Corporations (MNC) in favor 
of a nascent uniform legal regime. 8 Court decisions, and their con-
comitant business implications, suggest that the judicial applica-
tion of the Inter-American Convention is not likely to display the 
Convention's most significant benefits.9 Rather, the freedom given 
to the contracting parties to stipulate their choice of law and pro-
cedure, as well as the merely deterrent aspects of domestic judi-
cial enforcement of foreign arbitral agreements and awards, are 
the Convention's most significant assets.10 In order to deter 
reciprocal biases abroad, judicial policies11 have exhibited sen-
have become party to the U.N. Convention. List of Contracting States, 8 Y.B. COM. ARB. 335 
(1983). 
6. Although construed narrowly, there are, however, at least three restrictions on 
the application on the U.N. Convention in American Courts: Where the agreement is with a 
party from a State that has not signed the Convention and the arbitration is to take place in 
that State; where the site of the arbitration is a non·signing State even though both parties 
may be from signatory States; and where the subject of the arbitration is not commercial in 
nature. See Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S. D. Ohio 
1981). 
7. American courts have significantly limited the prospects for viable defenses to 
domestic enforcement of valid arbitration agreements and awards. See infra notes 129-274 
and accompanying text. 
8. Even in the presence of a specific treaty, domestic judicial interpretations may 
present American commercial enterprises with unfavorable circumstances. Divergent inter-
national legal doctrines frequently interject into even the most precise legal instruments. In 
this respect, unfavorable awards are more likely to receive domestic judicial recognition 
than favorable awards will be enforced abroad. See generally A. BERG, THE NEW YORK AR-
BITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 passim (1981) (discussing the problems associated with the 
disparate enforcement of the U.N. Convention abroad). 
9. "Arbitration is an institution resorted to by businessmen not wishing to go before 
national courts of law." Lew, supra note 3, at 878. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 3, at 1191. But, 
in terms of the parties' autonomy to delineate the applicable law, common law States, in 
direct contradiction to civil law States, qualify the parties' capacity to choose the binding 
substantive and procedural rules. In general, common law countries subject the freedom of 
the parties to certain qualifications as expressed by the conflict of laws rules of the lex Jori, 
See Croff, The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is it still a Con-
flict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT'L LAW. 613, 614-23 (1982). 
10. See Quilling, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments 
and Arbitral Awards: A North-South Perspective, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 635, 647 
(1981). Approximately ninety percent of the arbitral awards rendered by the International 
Chamber of Commerce (l.C.C.) Court of Arbitration are complied with voluntarily. Mirabito, 
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards: The First Four Years, 5 GA. J ; INT'L & COMP. L. 471, 481 (1975). 
11. Substantial judicial discretion has evolved from the significant latitude permitted 
by the U .N. Convention's implementing legislation which modified the 1925 Arbitration Act 
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sitivity to the problems associated with a rapid abandonment of 
the status quo when developing legal parameters that are 
measured by the transnational enforcement of commercial treaties 
and by the contracting parties' actual and presumed intentions.12 
The United States will soon ratify the Inter-American Con-
vention not merely because this Convention presumes to offer a 
slightly more precise legal regime: American ratification will be 
consummated because the Convention is an influential political 
tool for merging the O.A.S. into the mainstream of codified inter-
national business regulations In this respect, the common bond 
and "family" feeling among the American countries will receive a 
potent boost by domestic application of this ostensibly duplicative 
treaty.13 
This Note will examine the current application of the U .N. 
Convention in the United States. Some emphasis will be placed on 
the implications of past judicial policies upon present transna-
tional commercial intercourse. The Note will advocate that the sig-
nificant benefits derived from the uniform judicial enforcement of 
the U .N. Convention, in respect to transnational business trans-
actions, militate in favor of a uniform application of the Inter-
American Convention. 
IL THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. UNITED STATES 
1. A Dormant Regime 
American isolationist spirit strained the legitimacy of post-
by a new Chapter-2. Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692, (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 
201-208 (1982)). The implementing legislation was the product of congressional abandonment 
of domestic resistance to the process of international codification of a more substantive com-
mercial and legal regime. By establishing a relatively effective and stable method of both 
solving transnational business disputes, and domestically enforcing foreign arbitral 
agreements and awards, it was hoped that new business horizons would be opened for 
American corporations abroad. One of the chief goals of international commercial arbitra-
tion conventions, therefore, has been the mitigation of north-south business tensions. See, 
Lynch, Conflict of Laws in Arbitration Agreements Between Developed and Developing 
Countries, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 669, 670-71 (1981). 
12. Although Latin American countries have developed domestic systems for recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards, previously these States have consis-
tently resisted any foreign endeavors to have them join international arbitration conven-
tions. Note, Latin America and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quandary of 
Non-Ratification, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131, 134-40 (1976). 
13. The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAW. 
AM. 43, 53 (1977) [hereinafter cited as International Commercial Arbitration]. 
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World War II foreign attempts to establish a codified legal regime 
that would regulate international commercial transactions.14 Di-
verse national laws could not be effectively reconciled in favor of a 
practical legal framework, and international law had not sufficient-
ly matured to deter "questionable" commercial practices abroad. 
Divergent national laws indirectly promoted effective commercial 
practices which succeeded in circumventing the enforcement 
mechanisms of unfavorable arbitral awards.15 Attempts to expe-
dite the codification of a more precise legal framework that would 
govern international commercial arbitration were basically 
relegated to bilateral agreements or unilateral declarations.16 Rea-
listically, the international legal system could do no more without 
definitive American support. 
American unwillingness to assume an active role in the codifi-
cation of legal mechanisms to enforce arbitral agreements and 
awards was essentially the product of judicial aversion to commer-
14. The United States was disillusioned with the prospects of rapid unification of na-
tional laws on commercial arbitration by the treaty process. In the past, countries tended to re-
gard arbitration rules as solely within the competence of national legislatures. States were not 
willing to commit to any obligations which went beyond a mere declaration of existing national 
law. Sullivan, United States Treaty Policy on CommercialArbitration-1920-1946, in INTER· 
NATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 35 passim (M. Domke ed. 1958). This non-committal approach 
slowly eroded in favor of a belief that an identifiable customary international arbitration 
procedure must precede codification. Domke, On the Enforcement Abroad of American Ar-
bitration Awards, 17 L . & CONTEMP. PROBS. 545, 547-48 (1952). By the end of the Second 
World War, the European countries finally endeavored to facilitate the development of in-
ternational arbitration regulations by attempting to codify multinational treaties. Walker, 
United States Treaty Policy on Commerical Arbitration-1946-1957, in INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE ARBITRATION 49 (M. Domke ed. 1958). The United States remained unconvinced that 
diverse national laws could be incorporated into a legitimate international regime. See 
Walker, Commercial Arbitration in United States Treaties, 11 ARB. J . (n.s.) 68, 82-83 (1956). 
15. European economic integration produced, inter alia, an unprecedented increase in 
international commercial disputes. As a consequence, many parties found it difficult to ob-
tain effective remedies in the courts. Cohn, Economic Integration and International Com-
mercial Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 19, 25-26 (M. Domke ed. 1958). 
With the absence of readily available relief, transnational corporations were free to perform 
activities unabridged by legal and equitable principles. 
16. Articles expediting transnational commercial arbitration have been incorporated 
into treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN). Such treaties have been 
utilized as "broad, general-purpose instrument[s] which deal in a comprehensive way, on a 
bilateral and reciprocal basis, with the rights of ... trade, business, and shipping abroad." 
Walker, Commercial Arbitration in United States Treaties, 11 ARB. J. (n.s.) 68, 69 (1956). 
While the goal of this bilateral approach has been a uniform procedure between disparate 
judicial systems, "equally applicable to foreign and domestic agreement and awards," the 
end result has been no more than a "declaration of non-discrimination against foreign 
awards." Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J . 1049, 1051 (1961). 
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cial arbitration as a whole.17 American courts, as a matter of public 
policy, declined to unconditionally enforce arbitration clauses in 
otherwise valid contractual agreements.18 The pervasive Ameri-
can legal principle that the parties may not "oust the court of 
jurisdiction"19 contradicted common law principles recognizing ar-
bitration stipulations.20 This contradiction was finally resolved by 
a legislative decree. In 1925, Congress determined that arbitration 
provisions were valid per se.21 Private trade organizations similar-
ly added strong support for a more definitive American role in 
global business transactions. 22 The judiciary subsequently re-
solved that valid arbitration stipulations should be incorporated 
into the legal policy favoring the fulfillment of the contracting par-
ties' reasonable expectations.23 
Uniform domestic application of foreign arbitral awards could 
not mature until inherent domestic conflict of laws problems ceased 
to present significant obstacles. The Department of State did in 
fact briefly consider American accession to the 1923 Geneva Pro-
tocol on Arbitration Clauses in 1925.24 But, in the absence of signif-
icant support from the Commerce Department in favor of this pro-
tocol and its companion agreement, the Geneva Convention on the 
Execution of Foreign Ar bi tr al A wards, 25 the Department of State 
did not recommend accession to these Conventions. 26 The federal 
17. Quigley, supra note 16, at 1049. 
18. Corbin, Enforceability of Contractual Agreements for Dispute Settlement 
Abroad, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 251, 251 (M. Domke ed. 1958). 
19. Id. "Yet, most of the court so protective of their jurisdiction, have enforced provi-
sions that future disputes shall be resolved only by arbitration in a foreign state or 
country." Id. at 252 (emphasis added). 
20. See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-22 (1924); Kulukundis 
Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-84 (2d Cir. 1942); Tobey v. County 
of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065). 
21. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). 
22. Sullivan, supra note 14, at 35-38. 
23. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
24. 27 L.N.T.S. 157 (1924). See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 42. 
25. 92 L.N.T.S. 301 (1929-1930). 
26. Sullivan, supra note 14, at 45; Firth, The Finality of a Foreign A rbitral A ward, 25 
ARB. J. (n.s.) 1, 2 (1970). The legitimacy of these Conventions was strained by the difficulty 
of compelling a recalcitrant party in another country to adhere to an agreement to arbitrate 
differences. The lack of uniformity in national implementing legislation, as well as am-
biguities inherent in the treaties themselves, were additional factors militating against 
American ratification. Evans & Ellis, International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparison 
of Legal Regimes, 8 TEX. INT'L L.J. 17, 52-53 (1973). These Conventions "did not live up to 
the expectations of those who had viewed them as a decisive step in the progress of interna-
tional commercial arbitration." Contini, International Commerical Arbitration: The United 
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legislative organs were similarly unwilling to extend their foreign 
policy powers into local jurisdictions.27 Perplexing domestic con-
flict of laws contradictions, emanating from disparate jurisdic-
tional policies, frustrated any prospects for a coherent and 
cohesive foreign commercial policy. 
2. America and the New International Order 
In light of increasing world economic integration, the era im-
mediately following the Second World War evinced the need for a 
definitive international legal regime.28 Myriad problems emanating 
from differing domestic judicial interpretations of foreign commer-
cial contracts prompted a desire on the federal level to "remove 
the negative recognition of international arbitration agreements 
from the jurisdiction of local courts."29 State courts simply could 
not enforce a uniform legal policy which governed transnational 
commercial intercourse.30 
Abroad, national courts and legislatures began to appreciate 
the scope of the confusion. Governmental organs initiated signifi-
cant pressure on international associations to devise a more man-
ageable system. As a result, the International Chamber of Com-
merce proposed to the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
the codification of a mechanism for uniform international enforce-
ment of arbitral awards.31 The Council established an Ad Hoc Com-
mittee, which later submitted a draft convention to those parties 
interested in international commercial arbitration.32 In June 1958, 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign A rbitral A wards, 8 
AM. J. COMP. L. 283, 289-90 (1959). 
27. "Federalism" concerns militated in favor of states' absolute sovereignty rights to 
determine procedural rules under their legal control. Solicitor's office memorandum, Dec. 
16, 1927, DEPT. STATE 710.C2/265 2/6, cited in Sullivan, supra note 14, at 42-43 n.28. 
28. De Vries, supra note 3, at 45. 
29. Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United 
States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (1971). 
30. The primary difficulty arising out of diverse local laws is the absence of a "legal 
impact ... to enforce either the arbitration agreement or the resultant award." Id. 
31. Enforcement of International Awards, Report and Preliminary Draft Convention, 
Brochure No. 174, U.N. Doc. E/c.2/373 (1953). 
32. U.N. Doc. E!AC 42/SR.10/3 (1955). See Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards-Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. E/2822 (1956); id. addenda at 
1-6 (for the comments of these parties as submitted by the U.N. Secretary General to the 
Economic and Social Council). 
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forty-five states, and several interested intergovernmental organi-
zations, met in New York and codified the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards.33 
The United States was a relatively inactive participant in the 
codification process. Distrust of arbitral agreements,34 and the 
problems presented by the Bricker Amendment proposals, 35 were 
unyielding obstacles to more active American participation.36 
Members of the American delegation to the United Nations recom-
mended opposition to the U .N. Convention. 37 The American dele-
gation was convinced that the U .N. Convention did not offer bene-
fits sufficient to negate the costs of ratification incurred through a 
drastic change in the domestic legal procedure.38 American inac-
tivity in the codification process, therefore, was born out of resis-
tence to a rather rapid wholesale alteration of the domestic legal 
system. The time was not yet ripe for a definitive American inter-
national commitment. 
The relatively successful application abroad of the U .N. Con-
vention slowly began to provide an incentive for American recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign awards. Although only nineteen 
states recognized arbitration agreements by 1958, a majority of 
33. U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 26/9/Rev. 1, (1958). See also U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 26/SR.25, at 2 
(1958) (for the comments given by both the president of the codification conference and the 
participating States). 
34. Comment, United Nations Foreign A rbitral A wards Convention: United States 
Accession, 2 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 67, 69-70 (1971). 
35. The Bricker Amendment proposals attempted to further restrict the treaty-
making power of the Executive. The Amendment aimed to "impose limits on the subject-
matter of international agreements, stress the subordination of treaties and executive 
agreements to the Constitution and, finally, assert Congressional control over all 
agreements with foreign countries not approved by the Senate as treaties." Whitton & 
Fowler, Bricker Amendment-Fallacies and Dangers, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 23, 23 (Supp. 1954). 
By 1957, interest in the "need" to curb the treaty-making power apparently declined grad-
ually. See w. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 110-12 (1971). 
36. Springer, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 INT'L LAW. 320, 320-21 (1969). 
37. See De Vries, supra note 3, at 56. 
38. The American delegates were persuaded that the Federal Arbitration Act was 
"insufficient as a domestic legal basis for even limited adherence to the U.N. Convention." 
Czyzak & Sullivan, American Arbitration Law and the U.N. Convention, 13 ARB. J. 197, 211 
(1958). The limitations inherent in the domestic statute militated against ratification of a 
broader international treaty. Id. at 212. In this respect, the delegates recommended 
material changes in the Federal Arbitration Act which "would involve considerations of 
policy as well as of law", as a prerequisite to effective application of the U.N. Convention. 
Id. at 213. 
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twenty-eight states enforced such covenants by 1968.39 The 
Supreme Court similarly followed this trend by declaring that the 
1925 Arbitration Act is federal substantive law.4° The Court held 
that it is "clear beyond dispute that the Federal arbitration statute 
is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations 
of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.' "41 In the 
international sphere, America was party to eighteen Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties which contained provi-
sions for enforcement of arbitration agreements.42 By 1968, 
therefore, the path toward formal accession to the U .N. Conven-
tion had already been constructed. 43 
Mounting pressure from private interest groups representing 
the business community" ultimately persuaded Secretary of State 
39. They were Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Il-
linois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, 
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Aksen, supra note 29, at 5 nn.21-22. Of 
these, twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have enacted the Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1956 & Supp. 1983), which is modeled after N.Y. Arbitration Law§§ 
7501-7601 (McKinney 1980). Similarly, twelve states have enacted the Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. 417 (1962 & Supp. 1983). For an analysis of the Act's 
provisions, see Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The 
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1968); Scoles & 
Aarnas, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Nation Judgments: California, 
Oregon and Washington, 57 ORE. L. REV. 377 (1978); Note, Foreign Nation Judgments: 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Florida and the Status of Florida 
Judgments Abroad, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 588 (1979). 
40. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967). In this manner, the most 
significant objection of the American delegation to the U .N. Convention Codification Con-
ference was removed by the Supreme Court as a bar to accession to the U.N. Convention. 
See supra note 38 and accompanying text. It therefore became unnecessary to revise the 
1925 Federal Arbitration Act. 
41. 338 U.S. at 405, (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)); id., 
(quoting S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924)). 
42. Quigley, supra note 16, at 1051-54. While FCN treaties remain a prominent 
feature of American international commercial transactions the "treaties have limited use 
for U.S. parties ... because they have no specific implementing legislation conferring a 
basis for U.S. jurisdiction independently of the contract itself." Note, Enforcing Interna-
tional CommericalArbitrationAgreements and Awards Not Subject to the New York Con-
vention, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 75, 86-87 (1982). Nevertheless, the United States currently has 
FCN Treaties that include enforcement provisions with: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Surinam, Taiwan, Thailand and Togo. Id. at 86 n.48. 
43. The American Bar Association's Committee on International Unification of 
Private Law and its House of Delegates have also strongly urged accession to the U.N. Con-
vention. Springer, supra note 36, at 321; S. EXEC. E., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 27-28 (1968). 
44. The business community opined that the advantage gained by accession would 
outweigh the changes that would be required in the state and federal systems. See Com-
ment, supra note 34, at 702 n.15. 
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Dean Rusk to request President Lyndon Johnson to submit the 
U .N. Convention to the Senate for consideration. 45 The U .N. Con-
vention was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
which recommended Senate advice and consent to accession.46 On 
July 31, 1970, a new Chapter-2 of the Federal Arbitration Act of 
1925 was passed by the U.S. Senate.47 Thereafter, on September 
30, 1970, Ambassador R. D. Kearney deposited the American ac-
cession with the United Nations.48 
B. LATIN AMERICA 
1. The Background 
Prior to 1975, Latin American countries were generally unre-
ceptive to participation in international commercial arbitration 
conventions. This behavior apparently contradicted the express 
provisions of national codes which both permit arbitration of dis-
putes and provide for enforcement of foreign awards.49 The domes-
tic civil procedure laws, however, also contain provisions which 
limit the availability and effectiveness of arbitration proceedings.50 
Some of these impediments apply to recognition of both domestic 
and international arbitrations,51 while others apply solely to en-
45. Id. at 72. 
46. S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); to accompany S. EXEC. E. 90th 
Cong., 2d Sess. at 1 (1968). 
47. S. REP. No. 702, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1970). Act of July 31, 1970, 9 U.S.C. § 201 
(1982). The Senate first recommended accession subject to the changes needed in federal 
law. 114 CONG. REC. S29605 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1968). Cf. supra note 38 and accompanying 
text (for the recommendations of the American delegation to the U .N. Convention codifica-
tion conference). 
48. U.S./U.N. press release 126 dated Sept. 30, 1970, in DEPT. STATE BULL. Nov. 9, 
1970, at 598. 
49. In general, all commercial issues are arbitrable. However, in El Salvador, Bolivia, 
Paraguay and Peru, state property and financial interests cannot be arbitrated. See Codigo 
de Procedi~iento Civil §§ 56-79 (1947) (El Salvador); Procedimiento Civil Boliviano § 13 
(1959) (Bolivia); Codigo de Procedimientos Civiles §§ 548-582 (1942) (Peru). 
50. See supra note 49. In addition, prohibitions on non-national arbitration of State 
contracts have appeared in the constitutions of El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and 
Venezuela, and in the statutes of Colombia, Chile and Argentina. See Wesley, The Pro-
cedural Malaise of Foreign Investment Disputes in Latin America: From Local Tribunals 
to Factfinding, 7 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 813, 820-24 (1975). 
51. Judicial review of arbitration proceedings is generally limited to questions regard-
ing: the fairness of the proceedings, G. ROMERO, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF PERU 14 (1972); the 
arbitrability of issues under domestic law, c. AGUIRE, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF BOLIVIA 13 
(1972); and the parameters of arbitration. Note, supra note 12, at 132. The most significant 
obstacles to absolute judicial recognition of arbitration agreements is that few Latin 
American domestic laws e'xpressly provide direct enforcement of settlement of future dis-
putes through arbitration. International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 13, at 46. 
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forcement of awards made abroad.52 These domestic limitations 
have thus prevented extensive participation in conventions regu-
lating commercial arbitration. 
In 1889, the Montevideo Treaty on International Procedural 
Law was ratified only by Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, 
Peru and Uruguay.53 "Notably, it obviated the necessity of recipro-
city with its attendant problems of interpretation and burden of 
proof." 54 Thereafter, only Brazil ratified the 1923 Geneva Protocol 
on Arbitration Clauses,55 while no Latin American State ratified 
the 1927 Geneva Convention on the execution of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards.56 Limited Latin American support also characterized ac-
cession and ratification of the U.N. Convention.57 In addition, no 
Latin countries are parties to the 1965 World Bank Convention on 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States,58 by which parties may voluntarily submit 
their differences for binding arbitration.59 
52. Domestic enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is generally limited to awards 
which are consistent with public order and domestic law, and only to the extent where 
reciprocity applies. Where a treaty exists, its procedures govern the weight of the foreign 
award. Absent a treaty, the courts of the forum Latin American State would only enforce 
such awards if the rendering State would likewise enforce such awards. Note, supra note 12, 
at 134. Argentina enforces foreign judgments even in the absence of reciprocity. A. SIPER-
MAN & E. WEINSCHEBAUM, COMMERCIAL LAWS OF ARGENTINA 15 (1972). Normally no real 
statutory distinction exists between the effects of awards and judgments. In Latin American 
courts, however, judges are more confident of the "official" nature of a foreign award if such 
an award was of a judicial nature in the country of origin. Mihm, International Commerical 
Arbitration in Latin America, 15 ARB. J. 17, 21 (1960). 
53. Text in VITA, COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION GOVERNING COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION (Inter-American High Commission, U.S. Section) 59 (1928); translation in 
J. EDER, AMERICAN-COLOMBIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, (Parker School of Foreign and 
Comparative Law, Bilateral Studies, No. 5, 1956). 
54. Goldman, Arbitration in Inter-American Trade Relations: Regional Market 
Aspects, 7 INTER-AM. L.R. 67, 83 (1965). 
55. Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, done Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 157 (ef-
fective July 28, 1924). 
56. Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done Sept. 26, 
1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301 (effective July 25, 1929). 
57. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
58. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, done at Washington, Mar. 18, 1965, [1966) 1U.S.T.1270, T.I.A.S. No. 
6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, [hereinafter cited as CSID). 
59. Arbitration proceedings are handled by the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) at World Bank Headquarters in Washington, D.C .. See 
Broches, The 'Additional Facility' of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), IV Y.B. CoM. ARB. 373 (1979). Although the CSID does not require use of 
the ICSID, those parties voluntarily submitting their disputes to the Centre are bound by 
its decisions. CSID, supra note 58, at arts. 53(1), 54(1). The ICSID has been used rather spar-
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Latin American resistance to international arbitration con-
ventions seems to stem from regional distrust of arbitrations be-
tween foreign private parties and Latin American States.60 Such 
arbitration agreements are usually perceived as extraterritorial 
pressure which strain local sovereignty.61 Latin nations, in this re-
spect, normally demand that arbitration proceedings conform to 
local law. This attitude is derived from Latin interpretation of the 
Calvo Doctrine.62 Because most investment contracts between 
Latin States and foreign nationals contain a Calvo Clause,63 aliens 
are brought within the narrow parameters of local regulations, 
even if the domestic rules violate international law.64 This policy 
has had a significant negative impact on foreign investment in 
Latin America.65 
Calvo Doctrine objections to private-state arbitration should 
not have applied to the U.N. Convention. Although Latin Ameri-
can States "find ratification of the majority of arbitration conven-
ingly. Some experts believe that this fact is an "eloquent demonstration of the strong in-
ducement toward amicable settlement provided by binding arbitration agreements." 
Broches, supra, at 374. See generally Comment, A Courageous Course for Latin America: 
Urging the Ratification of the ICSID, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 157 (1982) (arguing that Latin 
American ratification of the ICSID will insure the growth of private foreign investment in 
the OAS and solidify the concomitant domestic economic stability). 
60. Note, Conflict of Laws in Arbitration Agreements Between Developed and 
Developing Countries, 11 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 669, 674 (1981). 
61. Even though Latin American States have ratified some international arbitration 
conventions the "existence of an apparently pertinent text does not guarantee that a legal 
settlement will be forthcoming." Summers, Arbitration and Latin America, 3 CAL. W. INT'L 
L.J. l, 14 (1972). In addition, regional biases have been responsible for the difficulties Atlan-
tic States have encountered in persuading Latin American nations to submit to arbitration. 
Even by the early 1970's, the economic gap between the developed and developing world 
did not sufficiently decrease to alleviate regional distrust of foreign commercial enterprises. 
See Note, Creating a Framework for the Re-Introduction of International Law to Con-
troversies over Compensation for Expropriation of Foreign Investments, 9 SYR. J. INT'L L. 
& COM. 163, 166 (1982). 
62. The Doctrine was adopted by Latin American States in the 19th century in order 
to curb military interventions by the United States and European powers in the name of 
diplomatic protection of their citizens. See D. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE 9-15 (1955). 
63. Note, supra note 60, at 675. 
64. The Clause is recognized internationally as legally valid only in cases where it 
does not bind the foreign party in violation of international law. See North American Dredg-
ing Company of Texas case (U.S. v. Mex.), United States and Mexican General Claims Com-
mission 15, 4 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 26 (1926). The developed nations are strongly in favor of 
application of international law to this area. Because nemo judex in re sua, no one should 
judge their own cause, settlement of disputes by binding arbitration outside the scope of 
any particular judicial system is favored by most large multinational enterprises. 
65. See Note, The Future of Arbitration in Latin America; A Study of its Regional 
Development, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 480, 481 & n.5 (1976). 
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tions unpalatable,"66 the U.N. Convention does not circumvent 
local law. The foreign arbitral forum, the potential choice of 
foreign law, and the power of judicial review, all inherent in the 
U .N. Convention, do not seem to challenge the sovereignty of na-
tional courts of law.67 Indeed, submission of commercial disputes to 
arbitration should allay the concerns of all developing States. 
Regional inaction can be best explained by Latin American re-
sistance to submit local laws to international scrutiny~ rather than 
by their criticism of the substantive portions of the U .N. Conven-
tion.68 Such scrutiny is an inevitable product of membership to in-
ternational conventions. In reality, the U .N. Convention does not 
prescribe the actual parameters of public policy for signatory 
States.69 Nevertheless, the Convention exerts some pressure 
against excessive deviation from commonly adopted international 
standards.70 Latin American States seem to be concerned with the 
apparent frailty of their nascent legal regimes in light of the inter-
national application of the U .N. Convention. This concern has 
strained the rapid development of a more manageable legal 
system which would ultimately attract new foreign investment.11 
2. The Codification Process 
In 1967, the Inter-American Judicial Committee initiated the 
66. Note, supra note 60, at 676. 
67. The U .N. Convention permits States to refuse recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards purely on public policy reasons or conflicts with domestic arbitra-
tion laws. See infra notes 235-74 and accompanying text. The Convention also empowers ar-
bitrators to conduct arbitration along the same lines as local rules. In this manner, foreign 
arbitration awards may be subject to the same substantive review as domestic awards are 
under Latin American codes of procedure. 
68. Note, supra note 60, at 676. Most developing States seem to project some 
resistance to compliance with legal precepts which were formulated prior to their existence. 
In general, the majority of developing nations did not participate in the formation of 
classical international law. Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic 
Order: A New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalization and Compensation, 12 LAW. 
AM. 1, 6 (1980). 
69. See infra notes 143-55 & 234-73 and accompanying text. 
70. See id. 
71. See Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission, Report of the Third 
Inter-American Conference on Commercial Arbitration (1971); Norberg, Inter-American 
Commercial Arbitration, 1 LAW. AM. 25 (1969). In order to attract foreign investment, so as 
to foster intrastate development, developing States must insure "[f]air treatment, [relative] 
economic stability, and an opportunity to realize a fair return on capital invested" as a 
minimum prerequisite to substantial and effective foreign investment. Raman, Transna-
tional Corporations, International Law, and the New International Economic Order, 6 SYR. 
J. INT'L L. & COM. 17, 38 (1978). 
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codification of the Inter-American Convention. 72 The Judicial Com-
mittee had the opportunity to study the Inter-American Model Arbi-
tration Law, which no country had adopted, and the U.N. Conven-
tion, which only two O.A.S. countries had ratified. The Committee 
reported the Draft Inter-American Convention on International 
Arbitration.73 The Draft recognized the validity of arbitration 
clauses for existing and future disputes and provided that the 
rules of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission 
(IACAC)7' would govern arbitration proceedings, in cases where 
the parties did not stipulate any procedural rules. The Draft also 
gave the arbitration award the force of a final judgment. The 
Draft Convention was forwarded by the O.A.S. to its member na-
tions as background for the Inter-American Specialized Conference 
on Private International Law.75 The Conference was convened in 
Panama in January 1975 where the Inter-American Convention 
was subsequently approved.76 The Convention, as approved, com-
bined elements of both the U .N. Convention, and the Inter-
American Judicial Committee's 1967 Draft Convention.77 
!IL INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION 
A. THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS 
The Inter-American Convention, signed by the United States 
on June 9, 1978, 78 was transmitted to the Senate by President 
Reagan on June 15, 1981.79 The Convention consists of thirteen ar-
ticles.80 
72. For a more detailed study of the codification process, see Norberg, supra note 71. 
73. REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT CONVENTION 
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, OAS/SER. l.VI.1, Feb. 19, 1968. 
74. The Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission was "originally 
established in 1934 as the result of Resolution XLI of the Seventh International Conference 
of the American States at its meeting in Montevideo, Uruguay in December, 1933." INTER-
AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION COMMISSION, RULES OF PROCEDURE 3 (1982). 
75. See Norberg, Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Revisited, 7 LAW. AM. 275, 
280 (1975). 
76. Id. at 275. 
77. Id. at 276. 
78. S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-12, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981), signed June 9, 1978. 
79. Id. 
80. The Governments of the Member States of the Organization of American States, 
desirous of concluding a convention of international commercial arbitration, have agreed as 
follows: 
Article 1 
An agreement in which the parties undertake to submit to arbitral decision any differences 
that may arise or have arisen between them with respect to a commercial transaction is 
13
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Article one does not expressly define the "commercial trans-
action" relationship to arbitration. Judicial interpretation of the 
valid. The agreement shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties, or in the 
form of an exchange of letters, telegrams, or telex communications. 
Article 2 
Arbitrators shall be appointed in the manner agreed upon by the parties. Their appoint-
ment may be delegated to a third party, whether a natural or juridicial person. 
Arbitrators may be nationals or Foreigners. 
Article 3 
In the absence of an express agreement between the parties, the arbitration shall be con-
ducted in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Ar-
bitration Commission. 
Article 4 
An arbitral decision or award that is not appealable under the applicable law or procedural 
rules shall have the force of a final judicial judgment. Its execution or recognition may be 
ordered in the same manner as that of decisions handed down by national or foreign or-
dinary courts, in accordance with the procedural laws of the country where it is to be ex-
ecuted and the provisions of international treaties. 
Article 5 
1. The recognition and execution of the decision may be refused, at the request of 
the party against which it is made, only if such party is able to prove to the 
competent authority of the State in which recognition and execution are re-
quested: 
a. That the parties to the agreement were subject to some incapacity under 
the applicable law or that the agreement is not valid under the law to 
which the parties have submitted it, or, if such law is not specified, under 
the law of the State in which the decision was made; or 
b. That the party against which the arbitral decision has been made was not 
duly notified of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration 
procedure to be followed, or was unable, for any other reason, to present 
his defense; or 
c. That the decision concerns a dispute not envisaged in the agreement be-
tween the parties to submit to arbitration; nevertheless, if the provisions 
of the decision that refer to issues submitted to arbitration can be 
separated from those not submitted to arbitration, the former may be 
recognized and executed; or 
d. That the constitution of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitration procedure 
has not been carried out in accordance with the terms of the agreement 
signed by the parties or, in the absence of such agreement, that the con-
stitution of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitration procedure has not been 
carried out in accordance with the law of the State where the arbitration 
took place; or 
e. That the decision is not yet binding on the parties or has been annulled or 
suspended by a competent authority of the State in which, or according to 
the law of which, the decision has been made. 
2. The recognition and execution of an arbitral decision may also be refused if the 
competent authority of the State in which the recognition and execution is re-
quested finds: 
a. That the subject of the dispute cannot be settled by arbitration under the 
law of that State; or 
b. That the recognition or execution of the decision would be contrary to the 
public policy ("ordre public") of that State. 
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domestic implementing legislation should, nevertheless, incor-
Article 6 
If the competent authority mentioned in Article 5.1.e has been requested to annul 
or suspend the arbitral decision, the authority before which such decision is in-
voked may, if it deems it appropriate, postpone a decision on the execution of the 
arbitral decision and, at the request of the party requesting execution, may also in-
struct the other party to provide appropriate guaranties. 
Article 7 
This Convention shall be open for signature by the Member States of the 
Organization of American States. 
Article 8 
This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. 
Article 9 
This Convention shall · remain open for accession by any other State. The in-
struments of accession shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the 
Organization of American States. 
Article 10 
This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of 
deposit of the second instrument of ratification. 
For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the se-
cond instrument of ratification, the Convention shall enter into force on the thir-
tieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession. 
Article 11 
If a State Party has two or more territorial units in which different systems of law 
apply in relation to the matters dealt with in this Convention, it may, at the time 
of signature, ratification or accession, declare that this Convention shall extend to 
all its territorial units or only to one or more of them. 
Such declaration may be modified by subsequent declarations, which shall express-
ly indicate the territorial unit or units to which the Convention applies. Such 
subsequent declarations shall be transmitted to the General Secretariat of the 
Organization of American States, and shall become effective thirty days after the 
date of their receipt. 
Article 12 
This Convention shall remain in force indefinitely, but any of the States Parties 
may denounce it. The instrument of denunciation shall be deposited with the 
General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. After one year from 
the date of deposit of the instrument of denunciation, the Convention shall no 
longer be in effect for the denouncing State, but shall remain in effect for the other 
States Parties. 
Article 13 
The original instrument of this Convention, the English, French, Portuguese and 
Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the General 
Secretariat of the Organization of American States. The Secretariat shall notify 
the Member States of the Organization of American States and the States that 
have acceded to the Convention of the signatures, deposits of instruments of 
ratification, accession, and denunciation as well as of reservations, if any. It shall 
also transmit the declarations referred to in Article 11 of this Convention. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly author-
ized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention. 
DONE AT PANAMA CITY, Republic of Panama, this thirtieth day of January, 
one thousand nine hundred and seventy-five. 
Inter-American Convention, supra note 1. 
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porate the U.N. Convention's broad definition.81 Commercial trans-
actions are presently defined as any dealings which naturally 
evolve from a legal relationship of the parties.82 This relationship 
is not limited to a contractual agreement, but must be of an inter-
national character.83 
Article two constructively implies that arbitrators may be 
foreigners or nationals of the forum State.84 The parties' stipulated 
choice of arbitrator, in this respect, may not be altered by 
domestic regulations. 85 
In contrast to the Federal Arbitration Act and the U .N. Con-
vention, 86 article three of the Inter-American Convention provides 
more certainty and greater uniformity through the application of 
back-up rules. In the event that the contracting parties fail to 
stipulate their choice of procedure, the Inter-American Commer-
cial Arbitration Commission (IACAC),87 a private non-governmental 
body, will substitute its rule for the lex loci arbitri.88 
81. 9 u.s.c. § 202 (1982). 
82. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). 
83. "[T]he foreign arbitration agreement must be recognized as a private contract 
even though the [forum] State may refuse to enforce the award." Comment, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 658, 671 (1966); cf. U.C.C. § 
1-105 (1977). This article attempts to incorporate conflicting domestic rules into a uniform 
system. See International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 13, at 44. 
84. See S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-12, supra note 78, at 9. 
85. Some nations objected to the parties' rights to select alien arbitrators. These na-
tions felt that " 'arbitration involves taking part in some way in the administration of 
justice, which should be reserved for nationals only.'" Norberg, supra note 75, at 282 
(quoting GAOAS Res. AG/Res. 48 {l-0171) at 52 (1971). The Inter-American Juridical Com-
mittee rapporteur opined that " 'arbitration is aimed at ending a conflict between private in-
terests ... [and] no sovereign prerogative is affected .... On the contrary, on occasions the 
differences between the parties in commercial operations reflect technical points, for the 
comprehension of which experts in the subject are more indicated than are jurists ... .' " Id. 
86. The U .N. Convention and its implementing legislation do not provide the judiciary 
with a clear choice of procedural rules in cases where parties have neglected to stipulate 
their rules of decision and procedure. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982). Indeed, even where the par-
ties were diligent in specifying their choice of law, their expectations, as expressed in their 
agreements, may be frustrated by conflicting provisions in national laws and by inherent 
restrictions on their choice of applicable procedural and substantive law. See United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law, Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/207 (1981). Thus, the United Nations has deemed it appropriate to charge a working 
group with the task of drafting a model law of international commercial arbitration. 16 
U.N.L. Rep. 40 (1982). 
87. The Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC) was estab-
lished at the Second Conference on Inter-American Commercial Arbitration in Mexico City. 
Norberg, supra·note 75, at 280. 
88. See INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION COMMISSION, RULES OF PROCEDURE 
(1982). The United States Department of State Legal Advisor recommended that American 
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The domestic enforcement procedural rules in article four, 
when applied to foreign arbitration awards, may not be more 
"onerous" than laws dealing with local awards.89 In addition, article 
four does not expressly limit enforcement of foreign awards to 
those awards made in the territory of another contracting State. 
The Convention, however, impliedly permits signatory States 
some discretion to exercise a reciprocity exclusion, similar to that 
specified in the U.N. Convention.90 
Article five's remedies have been incorporated into the Inter-
American Convention almost verbatim from the U .N. Conven-
tion.91 The Inter-American Convention essentially gives res judi-
cata effect only to awards that are no longer appealable in their 
entirety under applicable laws or procedures,92 provided that such 
awards are not tainted by any of the enumerated deficiencies.93 
Public policy justifications, in addition, may even negate an other-
wise valid arbitration award.94 Nonetheless, allegations of arbit-
rator error in law or fact may not be entertained by the country of 
execution. 
B. THE IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 
The American implementing legislation endeavors to clarify 
this country's application of the Inter-American Convention. The 
domestic legislation expressly delineates which Convention the 
ratification of the Inter-American Convention should stipulate adherence only to those 
IACAC rules in effect at the date of ratification. S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-12, supra note 78, at 
4. 
89. See U .N. Convention, supra note 2, art. IV. 
90. Id. at art. I(3). The United States has effectively exercised this exclusion despite 
the fact that the U.N. Convention implementing legislation does not expressly reflect this 
reservation. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 9 (1968); to accompany S. 
EXEC. E., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1 (1968). "This issue will indeed be resolved less in a 
theoretical concept but more by the discretional function of courts in evaluating the prevail-
ing features of the business transaction." Domke, The United States Implementation of the 
United Nations Arbitral Convention, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 575, 578 (1971). Apparently 
disagreeing with wide latitude for judicial discretion, the Department of State recom-
mended more specific language in the implementing legislation of the Inter-American Con-
vention. See S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-12, supra note 78, at 4. 
91. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982). 
92. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 80, art. 4. 
93. S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-12, supra note 78, at 9-10. 
94. The United States and Brazil strongly opposed other States' desires to limit the 
defenses to enforcement to public policy justifications. See Norberg, supra note 75, at 284. 
American Courts have narrowly construed the "public policy" defense to refer only to "the 
most basic notions of morality and justice." Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe 
Generale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKT A), 508 F .2d 969, 97 4 (2d Cir. 197 4). 
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courts are to apply in cases where conflicts are a possibility.95 Pro-
ceedings falling under the Inter-American Convention are granted 
concurrent federal jurisdiction, amounts in controversy notwith-
standing. 96 Normal venue requirements should not interfere with 
the autonomous intentions of the parties to select a place of arbitra-
tion.97 Enforcement of arbitration provisions should be considered 
only in the federal court in the specific district where the arbitra-
tion proceedings are intended to be executed,98 or in the district 
most reasonably related to the commercial transactions involved.99 
Defendants are permitted to relocate judicial proceedings from the 
95. The United States Department of State recommended that the implementing 
legislation: 
[w]ould provide that, here both conventions were applicable to a particular case, 
the United States would be bound by and apply the provisions of the Inter-
American Convention if a majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are 
citizens of a State or States that have ratified or acceded to this Convention and 
are Member States of the Organization of American States. In other cases, the 
United States will be bound by and apply the provisions of the New York Conven-
tion. 
S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-12, supra note 78, at 6. This recommendation has been codified in 
9 U.S.C.A. § 305 (1),(2) (West Supp. 1984). 
96. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1982) is incorporated by 9 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. 1984). 
Federal Court jurisdiction shall be based upon U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. Other requirements 
for federal jurisdiction are therefore inapplicable. The jurisdictional grant is "original" and 
not "exclusive," permitting state courts to adjudicate actions falling under the Convention 
subject to the removal provision, 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1982). 9 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. 1984). 
See Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 986 (1974~ 
97. 9 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. 1984) incorporates 9 U.S.C. § 204 (1982). 
98. Id. 
99. Even if the venue, partly predicated upon substantive law or diversity of citizen-
ship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976), is in contradiction with the parties' express choice 
of venue, the parties' intentions should prevail. Cf 9 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West Supp. 1984) ("a 
court ... may direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement ... [and] 
may also appoint arbitrators in accordance with the provisions of the agreement") (emphasis 
added). Where the parties have not indicated their choice of venue and there is no federal 
jurisdiction of the underlying controversy (e.g. where both parties are foreigners, yet the 
losing party has some assets in the United States), it is uncertain whether or not the enforc-
ing party has recourse in United States courts. Cf Metropolitan World Tanker, Corp. v. 
P.N. Pertambangan Minjakdangas Bumi Nasional, 427 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (a pre-
arbitration attachment case involving two foreign parties where the court stated in dicta 
that the plaintiff may have recourse to American courts for attachment proceedings). On 
the other hand, in light of the complexity of present-day corporate structure and operation, 
a "minimum contact" approach would suffice to make a foreign multinational corporation 
amenable to domestic judicial jurisdiction. In such instances, the court must order that "ar-
bitration shall be held and the arbitrators be appointed in accordance with" the rules of pro-
cedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission only in cases where the 
parties failed to stipulate the place of arbitration or the method of appointing arbitrators. 9 
U.S.C.A. § 303 (West Supp. 1984). 
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plaintiff-selected state court to a federal court presiding in the same 
jurisdiction.100 Lastly, because laches may prove insufficient as a 
legal bar to unjustifiably delayed enforcement of foreign arbitration 
awards, a statute of limitations is established.101 Having clarified 
domestic application of the Inter-American Convention, the im-
plementing legislation, therefore, will promote the Convention's 
uniformity and consistency goals. 
C. AREAS FOR CONCERN 
The Inter-American Convention, like the U.N. Convention, is 
not primarily designed to instantly formulate new domestic proce-
dural devices to regulate arbitration. Inherent impediments in 
Latin American codes of procedure are simply too entrenched to 
be receptive to a viable and rapid amelioration of the laws.102 
Modern commentators, however, opine that the obstacles and de-
lays in arbitration proceedings are normally substantially less 
than is the case in ordinary litigation.103 Nevertheless, global resis-
tance to arbitration procedures has hitherto impeded the applica-
tion of both the Inter-American and the U.N. Conventions.104 Sensi-
tive to this pervasive impediment, the United Nations Conference 
of 1958 and the Economic and Social Council jointly adopted reso-
100. 9 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. 1984) incorporating 9 U.S.C. § 205 (1982). The power 
to remove should be based upon 28 U .S.C. § 1446 (1970), where judgment on arbitration may 
be sought in either a state or a federal forum, Fuller Co. v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 421 F. 
Supp. 938 (W .D. Pa. 1976), providing that the defendant is permitted to remove at any time 
before triaL See Dale Metals Corp. v. KIWA Chem. Indus. Co., 442 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977). 
101. 9 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. 1984) incorporating 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982); l.T.A.D. 
Assoc. Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981) (concluding that a three and one-half 
year wait is not sufficient evidence of waiver of the duty to arbitrate under a valid agree-
ment). 
102. Latin American legislatures are normally either indifferent or vehemently op-
posed to perceivable change. "Further, arbitration uniformity is linked to basic questions of 
procedure and conflict of laws-areas traditionally difficult to modify" in Latin America. 
Goldman, supra note 54, at 82. 
103. International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 13, at 58-59. 
104. See Contini, supra note 26, at 287. Raman has pointed out: 
Despite growing awareness of the tremendous interd~pendencies conditioning 
the choices available to people everywhere, the global community, still operating 
on the basis of the outmoded nation-state system and suddenly exposed to the task 
of facing problems that have defied effective management on such a basis, present-
ly is confronted with a challenge to devise new structures for collaboration and 
new inclusive policies for cooperation, which, are capable of nurturing perceived 
interdependencies. 
Raman, supra note 71, at 18 (footnote omitted). 
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lutions advocating a greater diffusion of information which favors 
arbitration as a means of achieving both a more uniform legal 
system, and greater business efficiency .105 Voluntary private sup-
port for enforcement of foreign arbitration awards is a more vi-
able mechanism for achieving uniformity of laws than forceful 
statutory compilations.106 In this respect, the Inter-American Con-
vention merely attempts to relieve some of the inconsistencies in-
herent in the enforcement of arbitral awards by disparate legal sys-
tems, but does not aim to drastically alter the existing domestic 
legal mechanisms. 
The Inter-American Convention does not expressly concern 
itself with possible uncertainty arising from conflicts presented by 
accession to other international agreements. The United States 
and a number of Latin American States are parties to other multi-
national and bilateral agreements relating to arbitration.107 Al-
though the U .N. Convention recognizes prior international obliga-
tions, 108 and establishes a limited means of dealing with subsequent 
treaties, 109 the Inter-American Convention does not clearly resolve 
such possible conflicts of obligations.110 Legal conflicts may be par-
ticularly significant in a proceeding where the country of enforce-
ment and the country of arbitration are parties to both the U .N. 
and the Inter-American Conventions. For example, article II(l) of 
the U .N. Convention permits a court to direct arbitration only if 
the subject matter of the dispute is "capable of settlement by arbi-
tration."111 The Inter-American Convention contains no such limi-
tation. Furthermore, in the event the parties fail to stipulate their 
preferred arbitral procedure, the U.N. Convention does not ex-
105. United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Final Act, 
U.N. Sales No. 58.V.6 (1958). 
106. Nadelmann, Uniform Legislation vs. International Conventions, in INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 167, 179 (M. Domke ed. 1958). The United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has opined that conciliation may be more efficient 
than arbitration because conciliation is a purely self-enforced procedure. UNCITRAL, 12th 
Session (221st meeting), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.221 (1979). "[I]ts success depend[s] wholly on 
the desire of the parties to settle their disputes amicably, whereas arbitration is adversarial 
and not based on amicable settlement." Dore, Peaceful Settlement of International Trade 
Disputes: Analysis of the Scope of Application of the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, 21 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 339, 341 (1983). This remains to be proven. 
107. See supra notes 5 & 16 and accompanying text. 
108. U.N. Convention, 9 U.S.C. § 201, art. VIl(l) (1982). 
109. Id. 
110. Cf. S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-12, supra note 78, at 9, art. 4 ("provisions of interna-
tional treaties"). 
111. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, art 11(1), 206 (1982). See infra notes 136-39. 
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pressly mandate the application of any particular rules, 112 while 
the Inter-American Convention stipulates that the IACAC rules 
shall apply .113 Thus, in order to alleviate possible problems that 
may arise from divergent interpretations of different international 
obligations, the parties are well advised to clearly define the scope 
and procedural mechanisms of their arbitral process.114 
The implementing legislation115 expressly delineates the 
American reciprocity reservation116 to the Inter-American Conven-
tion. This modification endangers the pervasive legal policy of en-
forcing and promoting the parties' original contractual intentions, 
in cases where a written agreement to arbitrate has been incorpo-
rated into the contract governing the subject matter in dispute.117 
Although reciprocity reservations commonly denote that "in rela-
tions between two States each State gives the subject of the other 
State certain privileges on the condition that its own subjects shall 
enjoy similar privileges in the other State,"118 reservations based 
112. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. This conflict may be substantially 
alleviated by application of the United Nations Commission on International Law (UN-
CITRAL) arbitration rules. For the text to the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, see 
UNCITRAL, Report on the Work of its Ninth Session, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 
34-50, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976). See Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/168 
(1979); Norberg, supra note 75, at 277. Indeed, the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration 
Commission has modified its Rules of Procedure to incorporate important UNCITRAL Ar-
bitration Rules so as to formulate a uniform international procedure for settlement of com-
mercial disputes. INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION COMMISSION; RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE 3-4 (1982). 
114. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 13, at 66. See also Ehrenhaft, supra 
note 3, at 1205 (discussing the necessary clauses in an effective arbitration agreement). 
115. 9 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West Supp. 1984) states that "[a]rbitral decisions or awards 
made in the territory of a foreign State shall, on the basis of reciprocity, be recognized and 
enforced under this chapter only if that State has ratified or acceded to the Inter-American 
Convention." 
116. Under article 3 of the Inter-American Convention, the IACAC rules of procedure 
shall govern the proceedings in the absence "of an express agreement by the parties." 
IACAC article 16 delineates that the arbitral tribunal shall determine the place of arbitra-
tion "having regard to the circumstances of the arbitration." INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION COMMISSION. RULES OF PROCEDURE 10, art 16, §§ 1-4 (1982). The situs of the ar-
bitration, therefore, may be a State that has not ratified or acceded to the Inter-American 
Convention in contrast to section 304's mandate. See id. 
117. In general, reservations modify a State's rights and obligations under an existing 
multilateral treaty. This doctrine has been recently codified in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, opened/or signature May 23, 1969, reprinted in 81.L.M. 679 (1969). See 
also Comment, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: How International Legal Doctrine 
Reflects World Vision, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71 (1982) (for a more detailed discussion of the ap-
plicability and validity of reservation to multilateral conventions). 
118. A. BERG, supra note 8, at 14. 
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on reciprocity considerations aimed at the situs of the arbitral pro-
ceedings do not apply to international arbitration. 
Arbitral proceedings have developed as an alternative to na-
tional judicial system. The concomitant arbitration agreements 
and awards do not derive their judicial validity from a particular 
State but from the private arrangement between the contracting 
parties.119 The Inter-American Convention's field of applicability, 
in addition, does not flow from the nationality of the parties.120 
Thus, under the Inter-American Convention, the binding effect of 
a foreign arbitration agreement or award in the United States 
should not be predicated upon the lex loci arbitri.121 Domestic en-
forceability of a foreign arbitral agreement or award should be 
weighed against reciprocity considerations which attach to the lex 
arbitri-the substantive law governing the arbitration proceed 
ings.122 
119. Parties to an international commercial dispute should have the privacy for which 
they have bargained. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513 (1974). Indeed, the 
parties may in fact stipulate that the arbitration rules promulgated by an international 
organization (e.g. ICC, UNICTRAL, AAA, etc.) shall govern the procedural aspects of their 
dispute. In this manner, the contracting parties may remove themselves from the super-
vision and control of any national judicial system. 
The distinguished arbitration lawyer, Jan Paulsson, has concluded that even where the 
parties do not specifically announce their choice of law, "the binding force of an interna-
tional award may be derived . .. without a specific ... legal system serving as its founda-
tion." Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of its Country of 
Origin, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 358, 368 (1981). Paulsson has argued that an arbitration award 
not only "floats" (i.e. has binding effect in a foreign jurisdiction even when based on a dif-
ferent legal system), but also may "drift, that is to say enjoy[s] a potential for recognition in 
one or more enforcement jurisdictions without being ultimately anchored in the national 
legal system of the country where it was rendered." Id. at 358. 
120. Cf. Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed at Geneva, 
Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302 (requiring that parties be subject to the jurisdiction of dif-
ferent contracting States). 
121. For example, in cases where the parties stipulate their preference for arbitration 
rules of an international organization, "it is assumed that the whole world is a possible 
situs." Paulsson, Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why it 
Matters, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 53, 55 (1983). The lex arbitri is derived from the rules of the 
organization itself and may be supplemented only by non-conflicting rules of the local situs 
of the arbitration proceedings. Similarly, while the parties may elect as the situs a par-
ticular State chosen "either fortuitously or for reasons of neutrality having nothing to do 
with the parties' attachment to local rules of arbitration," id. at 54, they may actually apply 
the laws of another State more closely connected with the subject of the dispute. Under 
these circumstances, the underlying considerations which militate in favor of a reciprocity 
reservation are more applicable to the entity whose laws control the arbitration pro-
ceedings, rather than the merely convenient situs. 
122. Contemporary arbitration proceedings have indicated that the law of the arbitra-
tion itself is not necessarily the law of the place of arbitration: the lex arbitri is not the lex 
22
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 10
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/10
1983] Inter-American Convention 
IV. THE PROSPECTS FOR RECOGNITION 
AND ENFORCEMENT 
191 
The real value of American ratification of the Inter-American 
Convention will not be fully realized until the judiciary has had 
ample opportunity to scrutinize the Convention's stipulations. 
American jurisprudence will most likely follow the standards es-
tablished in its review of the U .N. Convention.123 Such standards 
reflect a public policy concern to maintain the neutrality of the in-
ternational arbitral process.124 
Judicial interpretation of the U .N. Convention has basically 
been derived from three distinct sources of law: (1) the substan-
tive terms found in the Convention; (2) the implementing legisla-
tion; and (3) the instrument of accession.125 It seem apparent, then, 
Jori. The traditional role of the lex Jori or the lex loci arbitri has eroded as arbitration pro-
ceedings have increasingly become delocalized. See Fragistas, Arbitrage Entranger et Ar-
bitrage International en Droit Prive, REVUE ENTRIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 14 
(1960) cited in Paulsson, supra note 119, at 362. Cf A. BERG, supra note 8, at 29-34 (discuss-
ing the relationship between "denationalized" arbitration proceedings and codified enforce-
ment procedures). An a-national arbitral award "accomodates international business trans-
actions in which the parties' divergent nationalities create a special need for a neutral forum 
for dispute resolution." Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 21, 24 (1983). For these reasons, local judicial intervention may 
encompass a greater hazard to the settlement of commercial disputes than the parties con-
templated when choosing a forum for mere convenience and not out of admiration for any 
legal principle. Local judicial intervention is only necessary when the arbitration proceeding 
directly implicates national or third party interests. See id. at 30. Thus, absent cogent 
justifications for local judicial intervention, a reciprocity reservation aimed at the lex loci 
arbitri does not effectively sustain this country's intention to promote and enforce uniform 
application of international commercial laws in light of the separate and distinct nature of 
the local forum as opposed to the law actually governing the arbitral proceeding. Under the 
Inter-American Convention, awards emanating from an arbitration proceeding conducted 
under the law of a contracting State or under IACAC rules of procedure should not be in-
validated because the convenient forum is not party to the Convention. Nevertheless, the 
contracting parties may supplant ostensibly threatening judicial consideration of the ar-
bitration award by conducting arbitration proceedings in the most convenient forum but en-
suring that the actual award is rendered in a State that is party to the Inter-American Con-
vention. 
123. Courts must first decide whether they possess subject matter jurisdiction over an 
arbitrable dispute. For an excellent discussion of the legislative history and intent of this 
issue, see Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 548 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
124. See Sch erk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (197 4). "[T]he principal 
purpose underlying American adoption and implementation of [the U.N. Convention], was to 
encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in inter-
national contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are ob-
served and arbitral awards are enforced in signatory countries." Id. at 520 n.15. 
125. The United States instrument of accession to the U.N. Convention expressed 
reservations of "reciprocity" and "commercial" disputes. S. EXEC. E., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. at 
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that domestic adherence to the recognition and enforcement of the 
arbitral process, as delineated in the Inter-American Convention,126 
will proximately follow the interpretations previously given to 
Chapter-2 of the United States Arbitration Act121 and article 11(3) 
of the U.N. Convention.128 Unbiased enforcement of international 
arbitral agreements and awards, therefore, is a requisite factor in 
promoting the efficacy of international commercial transactions. 
A. RECOGNITION OF THE AGREEMENT 
The Inter-American Convention itself does not include a proce-
dural mechanism to compel parties to arbitrate.129 In order to 
establish a more precise and efficient legal regime, the implement-
ing legislation incorporates many of the U.N. Convention's domestic 
legislative rules.130 The Inter-American Convention's implementing 
legislation, however, endeavors to remove some of the ambiguities 
associated with its U .N. Convention counterpart.131 
Section 206 of the U.N. Convention's implementing legisla-
tion132 obstensibly permits more domestic judicial latitude than the 
Convention's article 11(3).133 But the thrust of section 206, as inter-
preted by the courts, is not to allow for judicial discretion to con-
trol the arbitration proceedings.134 Conversely, the Convention's 
article 11(3) does not intend that a court is absolutely prevented 
from trying the merits of the dispute when the arbitration pro-
1 (1968). Whereas courts have recognized the need for a commercial relationship between 
the parties as a prerequisite to recognition of the arbitration agreement, Metropolitan 
World Tanker, Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangan Minjakdangas Bumi Nasional, 427 F. Supp. 2 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), at least one court has determined that the reciprocity reservation applies to 
recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards only. Fuller Co. v. Compagnie Des Baux-
ites, 421 F. Supp. 938, passim (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
126. See supra note 80, art. 1. 
127. See 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). 
128. 9 u.s.c. § 201 (1982). 
129. Article 4 of the Inter-American Convention allows for recognition and enforce-
ment of arbitral awards. See supra note 80. 
130. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 302 (West Supp. 1984). Generally, implementing legislation is 
sensitive to custom and usage of its subject matter. Strong emphasis is given to judicial in-
terpretation of the parties' intentions through an analysis of the relevant customs and 
usages because they form an integral part of the contract in dispute. See J. LEW, AP-
PLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 465 (1978). 
131. See, e.g., supra note 90; infra notes 155 & 157. 
132. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1982) (the court "may ... direct arbitration") (emphasis added). 
133. U.N. Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(3) (the court "shall . .. refer the parties to 
arbitration") (emphasis added). 
134. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). See l.T.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Poder Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th 
Cir. 1981). 
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ceeding is invoked.135 Rather, the court may decide whether the 
dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration, 136 and whether the 
arbitration agreement is null and void, 137 inoperative, 138 or incap-
able of being performed.139 Once arbitration has begun, the court's 
role is supplanted by the arbitrator(s), but the court is empowered 
to order provisional remedies at the arbitrator(s)' request, thus 
adding legitimacy to the arbitration process.140 Although the Inter-
American Convention does not expressly permit judicial evalua-
tion of the arbitration agreement, 141 public policy notions of equity 
and "fair-play," inherent in our system of justice, must undoubt-
edly be read into the Convention by American courts.142 
135. Although the question as to whether the referral to arbitration affects the com-
petence or jurisdiction of the court depends on the law of the forum, it has no real conse-
quence in actual practice. Gaja, Introduction, in NEW YORK CONVENTION (G. Gaja ed. 
1978-1980). 
136. U.N. Convention, supra note 2, art. V(2)(a). See Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1978). It must be presumed that the 
lex Jori, the law of the country where enforcement is sought, governs the enforcement pro-
cedure of the arbitration agreement. In general, American courts have presumed that 
domestic law applies to issues of arbitration. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 
(1974); In re Ferrara, 441 F. Supp. 778, 780-81(S.D.N.Y.1977), affd mem. sub nom. Ferrara, 
S.p.A. v. United Grain Growers Ltd., 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978). Under the IACAC rules 
of procedure, the "arbitral tribunal shall apply the law designated by the parties," or, where 
the parties have not stipulated their choice of procedure, the tribunal shall apply the "con-
flict of law rules which it considers applicable." INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
COMMISSION, RULES OF PROCEDURE 15-16, art. 33 § 1 (1982). 
137. U.N. Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(3). "Null and void" applies to those cases 
where the arbitration agreement is initially affected by some invalidity. Misrepresentation, 
fraud, or undue influence are all considered justifications for a "null and void" arbitration 
agreement. Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313, 1320 (2d Cir. 
1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 986 (1974). 
138. U.N. Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(3). "Inoperative" applies to those instances 
where the arbitration agreement has ceased to have effect. Revocation by mutual consent 
or failure of the arbitrators to render an award may justify an "inoperative" arbitration 
agreement. For a discussion of the right to waive the arbitration agreement, see I.T.A.D. 
Assocs., Inc. v. Poder Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981). 
139. U .N. Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(3). "Incapable of being performed" applies to 
those cases where the arbitration cannot be effectively set into motion. For the issues 
courts must resolve when deciding whether a dispute is arbitrable, see Ledee v. Ceramiche 
Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1982). 
140. De Vries, supra note 3, at 47 & n.21. 
141. In cases where the arbitration agreement stipulates the place of arbitration or the 
appointment of arbitrators, the relevant domestic legislation of the Inter-American Conven-
tion virtually mirrors that of the U.N. Convention. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West Supp. 1984); 
9 u .s.c. § 206 (1982). 
142. Although actual judicial involvement with the arbitration process is somewhat 
diminished in cases falling under the Inter-American Convention because of the application of 
IACAC procedure in instances where the parties fail to stipulate their choice of procedure, 
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The most extensive American judicial treatment of public 
policy standards vis-a-vis enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
was conducted in Antco Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Sidermar, S.p.A. 
(A ntco ). 143 In A ntco, a charter for the transport of crude oil con-
tained a clause which excluded Israeli ports as points of loading. 
Antco, the charterer, ceased performance of the contract. As a 
consequence, Sidemar petitioned the court for an order to compel 
arbitration pursuant to an arbitral clause in the contract.144 Antco 
petitioned for a stay of arbitration on the grounds that the con-
tractual exclusion of Israeli ports constituted a restrictive boycott 
against a friendly State.145 This action allegedly violated the public 
policy of the United States, as expressed in the Export Adminis-
tration Act of 1969146 and the New York Executive Law.147 Sider-
mar cross-petitioned the court to order arbitration based upon 
American accession to the U .N. Convention.148 
The court resolved that public policy violations must be in the 
entire "performance which is the subject of the dispute."149 In this 
respect, the restrictive provision was not sufficient cause to ex-
cuse Antco's entire obligations under the contract.150 Therefore, 
public policy defenses to enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
and the subsequent award151 must be construed narrowly.152 Such 
9 U.S.C.A. § 303 (West Supp. 1984), courts are advised to promote an expansive construc-
tion of the arbitration agreement so long as it complies with the minimum requirements of in-
ternational public policy' ordre public reellement international See J. LEW, supra note 130, at 
540. 
143. Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar, S.p.A., 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd 
mem., 553 F.2d. 93 (2d Cir. 1977). 
144. Id. at 210. Sidermar demanded arbitration with Antco and Nepco, its corporate 
parent and guarantor. Sidermar named an arbitrator and alleged $14,000,000 as damages 
arising from Antco's breach and repudiation of the contract. See id. 
145. Id. at 210-11. 
146. 50 U.S.C. App.§§ 2401-2413 (Supp. V 1981). 
147. 417 F. Supp. at 211-12 (construing N.Y. EXEC. LAW§ 296(13) (McKinney 1982)). 
Antco claimed that: (1) The exclusion of Israeli ports, as an act aimed to win favor with Arab 
nations, constituted a restrictive boycott; (2) the contract dealt with both exports and im-
ports to the United States; (3) the restrictive provision contravenes U.S. public policy; and 
(4) the entire contract is illegal and unenforceable. Id. at 210-11. 
148. 417 F. Supp. at 212. Sidermar responded that: (1) The restrictive provision did not 
constitute a boycott; (2) the contract does not involve exports from the United States; and 
(3) that American public policy favors enforceability of arbitration agreements. Id. at 212-13. 
149. Id. at 215. 
150. Id. at 216. 
151. See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du 
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). 
152. 417 F. Supp. at 216. 
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assertions should not be equated with United States nationa.J. 
policy .153 Although acknowledging that the arbitration agreement 
could be declared "null and void" if enforcement "would violate 
the most basic notions of morality and justice,"154 the court held 
that enforcement of the arbitration agreement in this case "would 
not contravene the public policy of the United States."155 
The A ntco case exemplifies judicial uniformity in enforcing 
the arbitration agreement.156 Such consistency, however, has not 
153. Id. at 216-17. 
154. Id. at 216. 
155. Id. at 217. 
156. American judicial decisions have reflected a narrow construction of the gr,.ounds 
for non-recognition of the arbitration clause in commercial contracts between private par-
ties. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (197 4); Antco Shipping Co., Ltd. v. 
Sidermar S.p.A., 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In contracts where one of the parties is a 
foreign State, however, American courts have invoked the act of state doctrine and the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976), as a bar to compelling 
arbitration. "[T]he presence of a state as a party to the dispute gives a particular coloration 
to the arbitration process." Delaume, State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration, 75 
AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 785 (1981). American Courts have observed that "[e]very sovereign State 
is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one 
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its 
own territory." Underhill v. Herandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
Courts have normally declined to separate the arbitration clause from the entire con-
tract when determining that the sovereign immunity doctrine supplants subsequent judicial 
scrutiny of the contract. See B.V. Bureau Wisjsmuller v. United States, 1976 A.M.C. 2514 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). For example, in Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab 
Jamahirya (LIAMCO), 482 F. Supp.1175 (D.D.C. 1980), a federal district court reasoned that 
the act of state doctrine is a legal bar to enforcement of an otherwise valid arbitration 
clause which was invoked in the dispute involving Libyan nationalization of Libyan 
American Oil Co.'s assets. Id. at 1179. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 
(1964), the Court stated that "the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of 
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government ... even if the com-
plaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law.'' Id. at 429. Cf. Sanchez 
v. Banco Central De Nicar, 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1981) (permitting judicial intervention 
under the exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(1)(3) (1976)). 
In this respect, the Second Circuit has distinguished the act of state doctrine from 
sovereign immunity. "Sovereign immunity implicates a court's jurisdictional power over 
foreign governments" whereas the act of state doctrine implicates a rule to be applied as a 
matter of our own substantive law. Empresa Cubana Exportadora, Inc. v. Lamborn & Co., 
652 F.2d 231, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1981). 
Recent domestic judicial decisions suggest that courts are more inclined to enforce ar-
bitration agreements than awards based solely on the contracting parties' agreement when 
dealing with a suit involving a state qua state action. See Note, International Arbitration 
and the Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine, 14 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 65 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, International Arbitration]. Embracing the "restrictive theory" of 
sovereign immunity, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 69 (1965), American courts today do not automatically abstain from scrutinizing a foreign 
State's involvement in purely commercial activities. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. 
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characterized the pre-award attachment analysis157 which high-
lights important procedural remedies available for more effective 
arbitration in the United States.158 Some commentators have 
argued that pre-award attachment is a unique feature of the Anglo-
American legal system and unfairly exposes international arbitra-
tion to the "eccentricities of particular nations' legal systems."159 
By permitting parties to resort to "judicially-imposed interim re-
lief," the courts will both undermine the uniformity purpose of in-
ternational arbitral conventions, and deter contracting parties 
from resorting to arbitration as a means of solving their disputes. 160 
Other commentators opine that the purpose of international ar-
bitral conventions is better served if the courts are permitted to 
add .substance to both the arbitration agreement and the arbitra-
tor's final judgment.161 In this respect, pre-award attachment is not 
incompatible with dispute settlement via arbitration.162 
The dearth of legislative history underlying American acces-
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). Courts are now required to "consider the merits of 
cases involving foreign confiscations violative of international law." Note, An Exercise in 
Judicial Restraint: Limiting the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act Under 
the Act of State Doctrine and Sovereign Immunity, 9 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 379, 386 (1982). 
Thus, the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity, which has basically emanated from in-
ternational conventions, encompasses judicial scrutiny of acts jure gestionis, State private 
acts, but not of acts jure imperii, State public acts. 
157. Pre-award attachment involves the seizure of the defendant's assets prior to 
rendering of a decision by an arbitral body. The purpose of pre-award attachment is to en-
sure the availability of assets for the satisfaction of an award rendered against the defen-
dant in the arbitral proceedings. 
158. Compare McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 
1974), Coastal States Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Navigation S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 
1977) and Metropolitan World Tanker Corp. v. P.N. Pertambangan Minjakdangas Bumi Na-
sional, 427 F. Supp. 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (pre-award attachment held inconsistent with the N.Y. 
Convention) with Drys Shipping Corp. v. Freights. Sub-Freights, Charter Hire, 558 F.2d 
1050 (2d Cir. 1977), Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Andre & Cie, S.A., 430 F. Supp. 
88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) and Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 
1977) (attachment permissible under the U .N. Convention). In recognition of this problem, 
UNCITRAL concluded in 1979 that "[w]here such a procedure is not part of the normal en-
forcement of an award but requested during or even before arbitration proceedings, the 
answer depends on the understanding of the aim of the [Convention], in particular, article 
II." Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9168 (1979). 
159. Note, Attachment Under the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1135, 1141 (1979). 
160. Note, Pre-Award Attachment Under the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 785, 803-04 (1981). 
161. 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION, pt. l.B.1 (G. 
Gaja ed. 1980). 
162. G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS: APPLICABLE LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF 
DISPUTES 79-87 (1975). 
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sion to international arbitral conventions, 163 together with a strict 
reading of the relevant statutory language yield the observation 
that pre-award attachment is not expressly part of either the 
U.N.164 or the Inter-American Conventions. The basic goals and 
policies of both Conventions, however, will be better realized if 
pre-award attachment is permitted in limited circumstances165 as a 
means of legitimizing the viability of arbitration proceedings.166 
The goal of the Inter-American Convention is to unify the 
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and en-
forced in signatory countries.167 Past experience suggests that the 
implementing legislation will promote a more stringent legal 
regime to enforce arbitration agreements than is actually man-
dated by the Convention.168 The judiciary will similarly resist any 
efforts to expand the narrow construction previously applied to 
express and implied justifications for non-recognition of the ar-
bitral agreement.169 The courts have long realized that arbitration 
mechanisms offer an equitable means of solving disputes, and are 
effective alternatives to already crowded court dockets. 
B. ENFORCING THE A WARD170 
1. Recognition of the Award 
The Inter-American Convention and its implementing legisla-
tion incorporate almost verbatim the U.N. Convention's mechan-
isms for enforcing the arbitral award. 171 The implementing legisla-
163. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044, 1050-52 (N.D. Cal. 
1977). 
164. See I.T.A.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981). 
165. See Carolina Power & Light, 451 F. Supp. at 1050. 
166. Cf Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobeacane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408, 442 N.E.2d 1239, 
456 N .Y.S.2d 728 (1982). Courts must consider whether such attachment was either intended 
by the parties or would significantly promote the efficient settlement of their disputes by 
the means specified. See supra note 158. Undoubtedly, an arbitration award renders attach-
ment orders "moot and unnecessary." Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Gov't of Israel, 689 F.2d 
301, 303n.1 (2d Cir. 1982). 
167. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
168. American courts have not hesitated to compel arbitration even in cases where 
such proceedings involve a foreign forum. See Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Diakan Hope, S.A., 
423 F. Supp. 1220 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
169. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
170. Because the Inter-American and the U .N. Conventions have practically identical 
provisions enumerating the permissible defenses to enforcement of arbitration awards, 
the cases cited interpret the provisions of the U.N. Convention while the analysis presented 
refers to the Inter-American Convention. 
171. The U.N. Convention's implementing legislation ostensibly presents some diffi-
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tion governs the rules of procedure for the domestic enforcement of 
an arbitral award falling under the Inter-American Convention.112 
American courts, when faced with a motion to enforce an arbitral 
decision, generally will not review the merits of the award but 
may, under the proper circumstances, entertain the defenses per-
mitted by the Convention's article five. 
2. The Defenses to the A ward 
The language of article V(l)(e) and the general provisions of 
the Inter-American Convention indicate that the party seeking en-
forcement of the award need not prove the award's binding effect 
in the lex fori. 113 Rather, the party against whom enforcement is 
sought must prove that the award is not conclusive.174 Because the 
purpose of the Convention is to liberalize175 and unify the stan-
dards for international arbitration,176 American courts have nar-
rowly construed the article V defenses available to parties against 
culty in the domestic enforcement of many foreign arbitration awards. Pursuant to 
Chapter-! of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982), the parties must insert into 
their arbitral agreement a provision calling for "judgment upon the award" to be instituted 
in "any Court having jurisdiction." Id. See Sperry Int'l Trade, Inc. v. Gov't of Israel, 689 
F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1982). Chapter-2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982) 
is silent on this matter. Because 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1982) mandates the applicability of 
Chapter-! to enforcement of arbitral awards, to the extent that it does not conflict with 
Chapter-2, it is unclear whether the domestically required provision is similarly necessary 
in enforcing foreign awards. 
The courts have adopted a rather flexible approach. The wording of the arbitration 
agreement and the conduct of the parties may imply consent to entry of judgment upon the 
award. See I!S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974); 
Audi NSU Auto Union A.G. v. Overseas Motors, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Mich. 1976). A 
more stringent requirement will undoubtedly produce an anomolous and detrimental result 
contrary to the purpose of the Inter-American Convention. The Convention itself, in article 
4, suggests that foreign awards will be enforced by similar mechanisms as domestic awards. 
In this respect, courts need not reach the issue of judgment upon the award. The parties 
need not invoke the judicial power of Article III courts: They are bound to the arbitrator's 
decision as a result of their contractual agreement to abide by it. The duties and rights 
which emanate from this contractual agreement should supplant any need for judicial in-
tervention. 
172. The parties may, however, expressly remove the arbitral procedure from national 
law. See supra note 80, art. V(l)(d),(e). 
173. Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical Instrument 
Co., 415 F. Supp. 133 passim (D.N.J. 1976). 
174. There is a strong rebuttable presumption that a foreign award is valid. See Par-
sons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l'lndustrie du Papier (RAKT A), 
508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). 
175. Id. at 973. 
176. Sch erk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (197 4). 
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whom enforcement is sought. These defenses will be analyzed 
seriatim in the ensuing discussions. 
Narrow judicial construction of article V defenses is generally 
attributed to considerations of reciprocity .177 Broad domestic inter-
pretation of article V defenses is likely to yield reciprocal biases 
abroad. Widespread nonenforcement, based upon expansive inter-
pretations of the available defenses to enforcement of awards, ser-
iously endangers the efficacy of the Convention and upsets the 
legal regime's predictability, as well as the stability deemed so 
essential to international commerce.178 Resultant disparate judicial 
policies could frustrate the essential purpose for resorting to arbi-
tration, namely the avoidance of litigation.179 Absent strong and 
cogent reasons, therefore, U.S. courts should endeavor to imple-
ment the Convention's goal of rendering arbitral awards enforcea-
ble in courts of law .180 
a. Violations of Due Process 181 
Article V(l)(b) affords a party, against whom enforcement is 
sought, a legal remedy to assert insufficient notice or inability to 
present its case. Despite this article's popularity and rather broad 
language, American courts have limited this defense to cases dem-
onstrating blatant violations of the contracting party's legal 
rights.182 The narrow construction of article V(l)(b) is particularly 
evident in situations where the courts have observed that viola-
tions of domestic notions of due process are not necessarily deter-
minative in cases involving foreign awards.183 The due process de-
177. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
178. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974). 
179. See, e.g., Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs lnt'l Traders Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 
1967); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate and Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 
808 (2d Cir. 1960). 
180. See 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 935, 942-43 (1975). 
181. It must be noted that American courts have not specifically considered the article 
V(l)(a) defense of incapacity of party. The related defense of immunity from suit, however, 
has been asserted in several cases. See, e.g., Ipitrade lnt'l S.A. v. Fed. Republic of 
Nig., 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) (foreign State agreement to adjudicate all disputes con-
stituted a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). For 
the article V(l)(a) defense of invalidity of arbitration agreement, see supra note 155 and ac-
companying text. 
182. Policy considerations favoring international arbitration supercede any allegations 
of violation of a contracting parties' minor due process rights. See infra notes 188 & 201 and 
accompanying text. 
183. See Quigley, supra note 16, at 1067 n.81. Cf. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co., 
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fense is therefore limited to apparent breaches of audi et alteram 
partem, the most fundamental principle of procedure. 
The first case in which an American court enforced a foreign 
arbitral award based on Chapter-2 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act,184 the legislation which implemented the United States' acces-
sion to the U.N. Convention, was Parsons & Whittemore Oerseas 
Co., v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKT A).185 At 
issue were several article V defenses raised by Overseas, a U.S. 
corporation, against confirmation of an Egyptian arbitral award in 
favor of RAKTA, an Egyptian corporation.186 Overseas maintained 
that the award was unenforceable because the arbitration tribunal 
refused to delay its proceedings during the Six Day War to permit 
the personal appearance of Overseas' key witness, David Ness, the 
United States Charge d' Affairs in Egypt.187 Construing this de-
fense narrowly, the Second Circuit rejected Overseas' contentions. 
The court noted that arbitration proceedings are not required 
to replicate legal remedies available in the courtroom.188 The in-
ability to produce witnesses in the absence of subpoena power is a 
risk inherent in arbitration proceedings.189 In addition, the pro-
cedural schedule should not be altered for the mere convenience of 
one of the parties.190 In this respect, the affidavit presented by Mr. 
Ness was sufficient testimony for tribunal consideration.191 The 
Inc. v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(stating that "this provision essentially sanctions the application of the forum state's stan-
dards of due process"). 
184. 9 u.s.c. §§ 201-208 (1982). 
185. 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). 
186. The contract in Parsons & Whittemore called for the building of a paper mill in 
Egypt. The project was funded by the United States Department of State, through the 
A.I.D. program. Before completion of the construction, the Egyptian government broke off 
diplomatic relations with the United States and ordered all Americans out of Egypt. The 
State Department instructed the American Company to cease performance of the contract 
pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §§ 2370(p), (q), (t) (1979). The Egyptian company demanded arbitration 
before the International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.), as provided in the agreement. The 
I.C.C. held the American Company in breach of contract. 508 F.2d at 971-73. 
187. Id. at 975. 
188. Id. (citing Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. The Washington 
Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1238 (D.D.C. 1971)). A later court observed that an arbitration 
agreement, incorporated in the commercial contract, defines the parties' substantive rights. 
Such rights may not be altered even by an express provision of an international convention. 
Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981). See also 
J. LEW. supra note 130, passim (advocating the supremacy of the parties' intentions as 
delineated in their binding agreement). 
189. 508 F .2d at 975. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. See generally M. HILL & A. SINICROPI. EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION passim (1980) 
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court consequently concluded that Overseas' due process rights 
were not infringed upon by the tribunal's refusal to delay the 
hearings.192 
The due process defense was further illuminated in Biotronik 
Mess-und Therapiegerate GmbH & Co. v. Medford Medical In-
strument Co. 193 Although Medford, the American respondent, 
received an invitation to arbitrate under the Arbitration Rules of 
the International Chamber of Commerce in Switzerland, it failed 
to participate in the proceedings.194 The American company con-
tended that Biotronik had knowingly withheld evidence and had 
engaged in a "calculated attempt to mislead the arbitrators." 195 
Biotronik responded that one party's failure to prove another's 
case neither constitutes fraud nor violates its due process rights.196 
The court reasoned that the mere fact that arbitration 
awards may be vacated under certain conditions " 'does not 
obliterate the hesitation with which courts should view efforts to 
re-examine awards.' "197 In an adversary system, a party must pre-
sent its own case, particularly in situations where it believes rele-
vant evidence exists to rebut the other party's arguments.198 In 
this case, no evidence was offered to prove that Biotronik actually 
prevented Medford from presenting its argument. The public 
policy defense of article V was, therefore, a fortiori inapplicable.199 
The court was additionally unpersuaded that domestic applica-
tion of article V(l)(b) was violated in this case.200 The court ob-
served that the primary elements of American due process are 
notice of the proceedings and the opportunity to be heard 
(discussing the burden of proof requirement and the evidentary weight given to affidavit 
testimony). 
192. 508 F.2d at 975. 
193. 415 F. Supp. 133 (D.N.J. 1976). 
194. Id. at 135. 
195. Id. at 137. Medford argued that Biotronik's non-disclosure rendered the award 
"'procured by ... fraud within the meaning of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 
lO(a) [(1979)).' "Although fraud is not one of the U.N. Convention's enumerated defenses, it 
is incorporated through either 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1982) or .the "public policy" defense of article 
V(2)(b) of the Convention. 
196. 415 F. Supp. at 137. 
197. Id. at 139 (quoting Newark Stereotypers' Union No. 18 v. Newark Morning 
Ledger Co., 397 F.2d 594, 598 (3rd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 954 (1968)). 
198. 415 F. Supp. passim. 
199. Id. at 139-40. The court did not reach Medford's fraud incorporation argument. 
200. Medford argued that it was unable to present its case because its rights and 
liabilities did not mature and could not be calculated until well after the arbitration date. Id. 
at 140. 
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therein.201 Medford received proper notice of the arbitral pro-
ceeding but voluntarily chose not to attend.202 The behavior of the 
arbitral tribunal and Biotronik, therefore, did not abridge Med-
ford's due process rights under American law.203 
The due process defense has been construed narrowly by 
American courts. Once a party has been offered the opportunity to 
present its case, a refusal to participate, or inactivity in the ar-
bitration process, is not deemed a violation of its due process 
rights.204 Due process merely implies that the arbitrator must in-
form a party of the arguments and evidence presented by its 
adversary and allow the party to express an opinion in the arbitra-
tion proceedings.205 Short time limits for the preparation of a 
defense similarly do not constitute a violation of due process 
rights. Arbitral procedural requirements, in cases falling under 
the Inter-American Convention, must not necessarily duplicate 
domestic due process guarantees.206 Such cases are governed by 
the parties' choice of law, IACAC rules, or the lex fori, 201 and 
receive extensive judicial scrutiny only in instances of serious ir-
regularities. American courts, therefore, should adhere to the 
weighty presumption supporting the validity of the arbitral pro-
cess208 by applying a narrow construction to article V(l)(b) 
defenses. 
b. Jurisdictional Limitations 
The Inter-American Convention's article V(l)(c) governs cases 
where the arbitration agreement is valid per se, but the arbitrator 
201. Id. (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972)). 
202. 415 F. Supp. at 140-41. 
203. The court assumed that American law governs this action. See supra note 136; in-
fra notes 207-08 & 224. 
204. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
205. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
206. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. For brief discussions concerning the 
impartiality of an arbitrator as a due process violation, see Imperial Ethiopian Gov't v. 
Baruch-Foster Corp., 535 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1976); Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Manage-
ment, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 953-55 (S.D. Ohio 1981), reh'g den. 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 
1982). 
207. But cf. Trooboff & Goldstein, Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 1958 New York 
Convention: Experience to Date in the U.S. Courts, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 469, 476-77 (1977) 
(arguing that the courts of a Contracting State should interpret article V(l)(b) to require 
confirmation of an award if the due process standards of the law applied by the arbitrators 
are satisfied). See supra note 202. 
208. At least one court has found a serious breach of due process rights even when ap-
plying the laws of the State which hosted the arbitration. Corporacion Salvadorena de 
Calzado, S.A. v. Injection Footwear Corp., 533 F. Supp. 290 (S.D. Fla. 1982). 
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has rendered a decision which was not contemplated by the con-
tracting parties, or which was not within the scope of the arbitra-
tion agreement and the subsequent questions submitted by the 
parties.209 This article was used by Overseas, the American com-
pany, in Parsons & Whittemore,210 as its fourth defense to enforce-
ment of the arbitration award. Overseas argued that the ar-
bitrator exceeded his jurisdiction by granting an excessively large 
award.211 The arbitrator granted $60,000 for start-up expenses, 
$30,000 for costs, and $185,000 for consequential damages, 
although the contract itself absolved either party from liability for 
loss of production. 
The Second Circuit reiterated its previous determination that 
article V defenses be construed narrowly.212 The court declared 
that, making its defense, Overseas must "overcome a powerful 
presumption that the arbitral body acted within its powers."213 
Such a presumption may be defeated only if the arbitrator pre-
mised the award upon a construction which is in "apparent" ex-
cess of the scope of his jurisdiction.21' The arbitrator, however, 
need not base his decision on express authority. 215 Consequently, 
the court concluded that "[a]lthough the Convention recognizes 
that an award may not be enforced where predicated on a subject 
matter outside the arbitrator's jurisdiction, it does not sanction 
second-guessing the arbitrator's construction of the parties' agree-
ment."216 
In Fertilizer Corporation of India v. !DI Management, Inc., 
(FCJ v. IDJ),211 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
209. Cf. 9 U.S.C. § lO(d) (1982) (authorizing courts to vacate awards "where the ar-
bitrators exceeded their powers"). The Inter-American Convention does not imply that the 
arbitrator may give a final decision on his jurisdictional parameters. Because the courts 
generally have the final say in this matter, most national laws provide the arbitrator with 
power to give provisional rulings on his competence. Such laws have aimed to prevent delay 
in the arbitration process and to alleviate dilatory tactics by obstructive respondents. 
210. 508 F.2d at 976-77. 
211. Id. at 976. 
212. Id. The court stated that 9 U.S.C. § lO(d) (1979) has similarly received a strict 
reading. See, e.g., United Steel Workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 
U.S. 593 (1960); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
406 U.S. 949 (1972). 
213. 508 F .2d at 976. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 977. 
216. Id. The court also observed that such a limitation upon judicial review is aimed to 
prevent usurption of the arbitrator's role. 
217. 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981), reh'g den. 530 F. Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1982). 
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Ohio faced a similar article V(l)(c) defense. Petitioner FCI, a 
wholly-owned entity of the Government of India, requested ar-
bitration through the International Chamber of Commerce pur-
suant to an arbitral clause in its contract with IDI.218 The duly ap-
pointed arbitration tribunal unanimously awarded FCI 9,679,000 
rupees ($1.3 million) plus $10,118.31. Subsequently, IDI refused to 
pay the award. In its fifth affirmative defense, IDI alleged that the 
arbitrators had exceeded their authority in awarding consequen-
tial damages. 219 The parties' contract expressly excluded any 
damages for lost profit. FCI responded that article V(l)(c) only pro-
hibits consideration of issues not submitted to the arbitrators.220 
The court observed that the contract in question clearly ex-
cluded consequential damages, and yet the award was based 
almost exclusively on such damages. The court, nevertheless, em-
phasized that its review of the arbitration award under the U .N. 
Convention must be narrow .221 The fact that Indian law limits 
judicial review of arbitral awards to cases where a "fundamental 
breach" upon which the award is predicated is readily apparent on 
the face of the record,222 may not bind a U.S. court to make a similar 
determination. Nevertheless, absent this apparent fundamental 
breach, the court decided to adjourn a final enforcement on the 
validity of the award pending resolution of the issue in the Indian 
court.223 
These decisions have added significant impetus to the prevail-
ing view that article V defenses are construed narrowly and 
should not entail a court's re-examination of the merits of the 
award.224 Courts, however, may evaluate the enforcement of 
218. Id. at 950. 
219. Id. at 958. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 958-59 (citing General Tele. Co. of Ohio v. Communications Workers of Am., 
648 F.2d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1981)). 
222. 517 F. Supp. at 960-61. The court concluded that Indian law controls because: (1) 
The arbitration was held in India; (2) the contract was executed and was to be performed in 
India; (3) the venue of arbitration was expressly stated to be New Delhi, India; and (4) 
neither party claimed that American law governs the contractual rights of the parties. Id. 
223. 517 F. Supp. at 961. IOI petitioned an Indian court to vacate the award, and FCI 
had petitioned another Indian court for confirmation of the award. Both petitions were still 
pending at the time FCI petitioned this court to enforce the award. Article VI of the U.N. and 
Inter-American Conventions expressly permits courts to stay enforcement of the arbitra-
tion award under these circumstances. 
224. The Second Circuit merely applied United States laws to enforcement of foreign 
awards. Other authorities have disagreed as to which laws apply in such situations. Com-
pare Quigley, supra note 16, at 1068 n.82 (advocating application of the law chosen by the 
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awards which are in part ultra or extra petita. 225 The courts are 
advised to balance the jurisdictionally excessive portion of the 
award with the unjustified hardship facing a party seeking en-
forcement, if the award in its entirety is vacated. An incomplete 
award, however, does not justify refusal of enforcement under ar-
ticle V(l)(c), or under any other ground of article V. The courts 
should endeavor to promote the Inter-American Convention's 
primary goal of uniformity and consistency through an evaluation 
of the parties' intentions, derived from an expansive reading of 
their contractual stipulations, and from a narrow application of 
any alleged defenses to enforcement of arbitral awards. 
c. Non-binding A wards 
Article V(l)(e) permits refusal of a foreign arbitration award if 
the respondent can prove either that the award has not yet 
become binding upon the parties, or that the award has been set 
aside or suspended by the country of origin.226 This provision has 
not been subjected to extensive review by American courts. 
Nevertheless, in FCI v. IDI,227 IDI argued that the award granted 
by the arbitration tribunal was not binding until reviewed by an 
Indian court.228 FCI responded that consideration of the award by 
an Indian court does not obviate the binding effect of the award.229 
The court observed, following its review of Indian law, that the 
award is res judicata as to the parties when made.230 The court 
parties or the law of the State where the award was made) with Trooboff & Goldstein, 
supra note 207, at 478 (advocating arbitrator discretion in choosing the law preferred by the 
parties, arbitrators, or the law of the State where the arbitration was conducted). See supra 
note 203. 
225. Such awards contain decisions which are partially or entirely outside the scope of 
the questions submitted to the arbitration tribunal. 
226. The term "binding" borrowed from "final" as expressed in the Geneva Convention 
of 1927, done Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301 (effective July 26, 1929), was the most discussed 
proviso at the U.N. Convention Conference of 1958. For an excellent examination of the 
problems associated with the different interpretations of this term, see Domke, The United 
States Implementation of the United Nations Arbitral Convention, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 575, 
578-84 (1971). . 
227. 517 F. Supp. at 948. 
228. Id. at 956. IDI alleged that Indian courts conduct a more expansive review of the 
defenses to enforcement of arbitral awards. Under Indian law, "speaking awards" may be 
vacated for any error of law, whereas under American law review is permitted only if the 
award is in "manifest disregard" of the law. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. Article IV of the Inter-American Convention suggests that the court's decision 
may have been different had this case arisen under this Convention. Cf. infra note 231. 
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concluded that an appeal to a judicial body of an arbitration award 
does not toll the binding effect of the award.231 
The district court reiterated the uniform American judicial 
policy to narrowly construe the defenses to enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. The petitioner need not receive judicial enforce-
ment of the a ward under the lex arbitri for the a ward to be bind-
ing under the lex loci arbitri and under the lex fori. 232 The award is 
normally binding at the moment at which it is no longer open to 
genuine appeal on the merits to a second arbitral body, or to a 
judicial court in those instances where such means of recourse are 
available.233 
d. Public Policy Ex Officio 
Public policy is a traditional ground available to the contract-
ing parties, and the courts sua sponte, when reluctant to abide by 
or to enforce foreign arbitral awards and to apply foreign law. The 
public policy defense is intended to safeguard the "fundamental 
moral convictions or policies of the forum." 234 Article V(2) of the 
Inter-American Convention empowers courts to scrutinize awards 
which are perceived to threaten public policy. The first part of 
this article concerns the non-arbitrability of the subject matter of 
the arbitration,235 while the second governs pure policy justifica-
tions for non-enforcement of the arbitral award.236 
Domestic judicial examination of the non-arbitrable subjec~ 
matter defense of article V(2)(a) has been relatively limited. In 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,237 the United States Supreme Court 
231. Id. at 957. One commentator succinctly stated that the "award will be considered 
'binding' for the purposes of the Convention if no further recourse may be had to another ar-
bitral tribunal. ... The fact that recourse may be had to a court of law does not prevent the 
award from being 'binding.'" Asken, supra note 29, at 11. 
232. Mann, State Contracts and International Arbitration, 1967 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 6. 
233. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
234. J. LEW, supra note 130, at , 403. 
235. Non-arbitrable matters include, inter alia, disputes which involve antitrust, in-
tellectual property rights, family law, equity considerations, and those which arise from con-
tracts not commercial in nature. See, e.g., B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 1976 
A.M.C. 2514 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (where the court stated that relations arising out of activities of 
warships have never been regarded as commercial in nature). The non-arbitrability of sub-
ject matter defense to enforcement is not accepted if the subject matter is only of an in-
cidental nature in the resolution of the dispute. See Audi-NSU Auto-Union A.G. v. Overseas 
Motors Inc., 418 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
236. Article V(2)(b) seems to be a provision of residual application for those cases not 
expressly covered by other provisions of the Inter-American Convention. 
237. 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
38
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1983], Art. 10
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol10/iss1/10
1983) Inter-American Convention 207 
was faced with a conflict between an international commercial ar-
bitration agreement and the unwaivable protections for investors 
under the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act (SEA).238 Although 
the litigants had initially agreed to arbitrate all disputes, the 1934 
SEA became applicable when Alberto-Culver alleged that Scherk 
had made fraudulant representations of trademark rights.239 The 
Court was asked to resolve whether the arbitration agreement or 
the unwaivable statute240 would control the settlement of this 
dispute. 
The Court concluded that because the arbitration agreement 
was "truly international",241 the U.N. Convention's uniformity and 
consistency policies outweighed the benefits intended by domestic 
statutory protections. 242 A contrary result would produce uncer-
tainty in a conflict of laws situation, and would operate to 
frustrate the advantages of arbitration agreements.243 Thus, the 
Court was able to transform a non-arbitrable subject matter into a 
case falling within the parameters of the U .N. Convention by pro-
moting policy reasons which are also at the root of the Inter-
American Convention.244 
In Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab 
Jamahirya (LIAMCOJ,245 a federal district court invoked the act of 
238. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Ch. 404, § lOb; 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) 
(1934); Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. 
239. The 1934 SEA is normally automatically applicable to cases involving allegations 
of fraud. See id. 
240. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
241. 417 U.S. at 515. Cf. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Boyd v. Grand Trunk 
W.R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949) (in which arbitrations without international ramifications 
were superceded by federal acts). 
242. 417 U.S. at 515-17. 
243. Id. 
244. Although Scherk was decided in the specific circumstances of an alleged violation 
of the securities laws, the Court's reasoning would appear to compel the same result in an 
international dispute in which one of the parties alleges violation of a statute designed 
primarily to protect public rights as opposed to commercial relations between contracting 
parties. The Court, therefore, seems to have enforced the proposition that international ar-
bitration proceedings may be unsympathetic to defenses based solely on purely domestic 
statutes, even where the contract by its terms is governed by the laws of that country. See 
Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar, Sp.A., 417 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
245. 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980). Following settlement by the parties, several 
groups appeared before the Circuit Court as amici curiae while the case was on appeal and 
asked that the district court's decision be vacated as moot. Motions of Amici Curiae Re-
questing an Order Vacating the Jan. 18 1980 Order of the District Court as Moot, Libyan 
Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980). 
The D.C. Circuit granted the motion by an order dated May 6, 1981. 
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state doctrine, incorporated into the U .N. Convention by article 
V(2)(a), to bar enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. In 1973 and 
1974, Libya nationalized LIAMCO's rights under certain 
petroleum concessions. Following the breakdown of negotiations 
for reparations, LIAMCO commenced an arbitration proceeding 
against Libya under the arbitration clause contained in the conces-
sions.246 Libya refused to participate in the arbitration, which 
culminated in LIAMCO's favor. 247 LIAMCO asked the United 
States district court to enforce the award in light of the American 
accession to the U.N. Convention. As one of its defenses, Libya 
claimed that the court should refrain from enforcing the award 
under the Convention's article V(2)(a) incorporation of the act of 
state doctrine.248 
The court observed that Libya's nationalization of LIAMCO's 
assets and the concomitant schedule of compensation was the 
"subject matter of the difference" encompassed by article V(2)(a).249 
Moreover, had the parties initiated the settlement of their dispute 
before this court, the court would have declined jurisdiction 
because it could not rule on the validity of the Libyan nationaliza-
tion law.250 In this respect, judicial abstention, in light of the act of 
state doctrine, is within the scope and design of the article V(2)(a) 
defenses.251 The court, therefore, refused to recognize or enforce 
the arbitral award.252 
Generally, article V(2)(a) non-arbitrability of subject matter 
defenses have received unfavorable cursory treatment in 
American courts. The LIAM CO de<!ision, however, seems to 
assert that certain fundamental poli~y justifications are more 
246. The concessions signed in 1955 contained an arbitration clause providing for 
Libya's capital, Tripoli, as the locale. The clause was amended in 1966 at LIAMCO's request 
to provide for arbitration either by mutual agreement of the parties or by decision of the ar-
bitrators. 482 F. Supp. at 1177. 
247. Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Jamahirya (1977) (Mahmassani, 
arb.) (LIAMCO Award), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981). 
248. The act of state doctrine: 
[R]equires only that, when it is made to appear that the foreign government has 
acted in a given way on the subject-matter of the litigation, the details of such ac-
tion or the merit of the result cannot be questioned, but must be accepted by our 
courts as a rule for their decision. 
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1917). See supra note 156. 
249. 482 F. Supp. at 1178. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 1178-79. 
252. Id. at 1179. 
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important than international commercial arbitration.253 This deci-
sion cannot be easily reconciled with existing domestic application 
of the U.N. Convention. Nevertheless, the tone of the opinion 
suggests that international commercial transactions, between 
private corporations and foreign states, would ultimately benefit 
from such a judicial determination. Significant freedom allocated 
to foreign state qua state behavior is likely to yield commensurate 
benefits. Foreign governments would be more inclined to enter-
tain commercial contracts which permit less restrictive foreign in-
vestment. In this respect, the U .N. and Inter-American Conven-
tions' ultimate goal of alleviating the problems associated with in-
ternational commercial intercourse, may actually be better served 
by this uniquely expansive reading of article V(2)(a). 
The dearth of legislative history leading to the codification of 
article V(2)(b) illustrates the imprecise nature of the guidelines 
within which courts have had to operate when considering 
domestic application of this defense to enforcement of foreign ar-
bitral awards.254 The public policy defense could conceivably en-
compass all allegations which invoke existing policy concerns, as 
well as any new defenses courts may choose to entertain.255 As 
noted above,256 public policy invokes the fundamental moral convic-
tions and policies of the forum State. What constitutes a violation 
of public policy is largely a question of fact and will be decided on 
253. Commentators have harshly criticized the LIAMCO decision for failing to 
recognize the full potential of benefits inherent in the arbitration process. One scholar con-
cluded that: 
The act of state doctrine did not represent a sufficiently overriding national in-
terest to justify the nonenforcement of the LIAMCO award under article V(2)(a). 
The doctrine has been sharply curtailed by the commercial and territorial excep-
tions as well as by the Hickenlooper Amendment [22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976)]. It is 
designed to permit judicial abstention only when there is a lack of consensus 
regarding the applicable international legal principles or a potential risk of judicial 
interference with the Executive's conduct of U.S. foreign policy .... Thus, to in-
clude the act of state doctrine within the article V(2)(a) defense would impair the 
ability of U.S. businesses to have similar awards enforced abroad. This result 
would undercut the utility of arbitral clauses in long-term investment agreements 
and would undermine the goals of the Convention. 
Note, International Arbitration, supra note 156, at 150, 152 (footnotes omitted). 
254. Parsons & Whittemore significantly narrowed the Second Circuit's entertainment 
of the article V(2)(b) defense. The court expressly concluded that "public policy" does not in-
fer "national policy." The public policy defense "was not meant to enshrine the vagaries of 
international politics under the rubric of 'public policy.'" 508 F.2d at 974. 
255. Comment, International Commercial Arbitration Under the United Nations Con-.. 
vention and the Amended Federal Arbitration Statute, 47 WASH. L. REV. 441, 446 (1972). 
256. Supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
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an ad hoc basis.257 In the United States, issues of public policy have 
emerged in nearly every case under the U.N. Convention.258 
Nevertheless, the most prominent recurring article V(2)(b) argu-
ment is the question of arbitrator impartiality. 
In Imperial Ethiopian Government v. Baruch-Foster Corp. ,259 
the Fifth Circuit entered judgment confirming a foreign arbitral 
award, without compelling the appellee to honor the appellant's 
"far reaching" request for discovery, when there was no evidence 
of disqualification other than the loser's bare assertions.260 Ap-
pellant Baruch-Foster Corporation neither paid nor challenged a 
1974 arbitral decision granting Ethiopia a $703,188 award. The 
government of Ethiopia sought American judicial confirmation of 
the award based upon the U .N. Convention and its implementing 
legislation. The appellant contended that the president of the ar-
bitration panel had a material connection with the Ethiopian 
government which biased his decision.261 
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny 
the appellant's arguments challenging the validity of the award.262 
The court observed that where there is sufficient evidence in the 
record itself, vouching for the character and integrity of the ques-
tioned individual, the court will presume the validity of the 
award.263 The court concluded that the "loser in arbitration cannot 
freeze the confirmation proceedings in their tracks and indef-
initely postpone judgment" by questioning the impartiality of the 
arbitrator .264 
257. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
258. See, e.g., Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. 
Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga 1980) (concluding that the arbitrators' application of French law, which 
established a penalty interest rate upon the award, was impermissible under U.S. law); 
Transmarine Seaways Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979) (concluding that a party alleging duress has the heavy burden of establishing that it 
was so overborne that it lost any other options it may have had). 
259. 535 F .2d 334 (5th Cir. 197 4). 
260. Id. at 336. 
261. Id. at 335. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 337. It seems likely that this pronouncement resulted from the court's im-
pression of the parties involved, particulary Baruch-Foster as a bad-faith operator. Baruch-
Foster Corporation had apparently been engaging in dilatory tactics throughout the pro-
cess, and the court viewed this defense as one more delay. Therefore, the key to this deci-
sion is the court's desire to implement the policy of expediting the confirmation of arbitral 
awards. 
264. 535 F .2d at 337. 
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In FCI v. !Dl,265 IDI asserted that Mr. B. Sen, the arbitrator 
nominated by FCI, had served as council for FCI in at least two 
other proceedings and that such facts were not disclosed to IDl.266 
FCI responded that Mr. Sen was chosen properly under the I.C.C. 
rules, which governed the proceedings, as well as under the U.N. 
Convention's stipulations.267 The court agreed with IDI that 
American public policy requires that settlement of controversies 
by arbitration "not only must be unbiased but also must avoid 
even the appearance of bias."268 The court, however, distinguished 
this case on the facts from previous decisions holding . to the con-
trary. 269 In particular, Mr. Sen was not the third neutral member 
on the arbitration panel, but rather was appointed by FCl.270 In 
this respect, the court concluded that overwhelming American 
public policy favors enforcement of an award that although "ap-
pears" biased271 is actually not biased in fact. 272 
Domestic application of article V(2)(b), by which a court may 
refuse enforcement of a foreign arbitral award sua sponte, has not 
been one of a residual nature, but has coexisted with other provi-
sions of the U .N. Convention. In this respect, when deciding cases 
falling under the Inter-American Convention,273 courts will nar-
265. 517 F. Supp. at 948. On motion to rehear, the court reiterated its view that 
American public policy had not been offended. 530 F. Supp. 542, 545-46 (S.D. Ohio 1982). 
266. 517 F. Supp. at 953. 
267. Id. 
268. Id. at 954 (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 
U.S. 145, 150 (1969)). 
269. 517 F. Supp. at 954-55. 
270. Id. 
271. See aslo Int'l Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied 451U.S.1017 (1981) (deciding that an award should not be vacated because of an ap-
pearance of bias). 
272. 517 F. Supp. at 955. 
273. Under the Inter-American Convention, in cases where the parties fail to stipulate 
their choice of law, the IACAC rules are automatically invoked. The IACAC rules of pro-
cedure expressly provide that a party may challenge an arbitrator within fifteen days either 
"after the appointment of the challenged arbitrator or after the circumstances that give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence ... become 
known to the party." INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION COMMISSION, RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE 8-9, arts. 9-11 (1982). If the challenged arbitrator is replaced, the rules provide that: 
"[if] the sole or presiding arbitrator is replaced, any hearing held previously shall be 
repeated; if any other arbitrator is replaced, such prior hearings may be repeated at the 
discretion of the arbitral tribunal." Id. at 10, art. 14. Alternatively, in cases where the par-
ties do in fact stipulate their choice of procedure, that procedure governs the challenge to 
arbitrator(s). If the stipulated procedure is silent as to this matter, the guidelines provided 
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rowly construe allegations of national public policy violations.274 
The test to be applied, in cases alleging biased awards, will not be 
based upon the circumstances which have created the lack of im-
partiality, but rather on whether the arbitrator has effectively 
acted in an unbiased manner. 
V. CONCLUSION 
American ratification of the Inter-American Convention will 
definitively promote a more efficient legal regime ensuring the 
equitable settlement of international commercial disputes. The 
Convention's field of applicability, however, is limited to the en-
forcement of foreign arbitration agreements and awards within its 
purview .275 It does not presume to give an all-embracing regulation 
of international arbitration.276 Uniform legal mechanisms, 
established by means of international conventions, have never 
spontaneously altered the behavior and policy of national courts.277 
This is particularly evident here, in light of cognizable Latin 
American aversion to binding international commitments.278 In 
this respect, issues of sovereign immunity and the act of state doc-
trine are additional testimony to the ambiguities associated with 
domestic enforcement of foreign arbitral agreements and 
awards.279 The Inter-American Convention itself, therefore, will 
not resolve the myriad impediments to uniform enforcement in-
herent in diverse national systems. The Convention, however, will 
by courts interpreting the U.N. Convention shall prevail. See supra notes 259-72 and accom-
panying text. 
274. For the differences between national and international public policy, see Sanders, 
Consolidated Commentary, IV Y.B. COM. ARB. 231, 251 (1979), and supra note 141. 
275. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements and awards not covered by the Inter-American and U.N. Conven-
tions, see Note, supra note 42, at 89-100. 
276. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. 
277. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. On the treatment of foreign arbitra-
tion in countries other than the United States, see Beaumont, Dispute Resolution and Ar-
bitration in Britain: Current Trends and Prospects, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 323 (1982); 
Bertram-Nothnagel, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and A rbitral A wards in West Ger-
many, 17 VA. J. INT"L L. 385 (1977); Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Court Doc-
trine on Inter-National Commercial Arbitration: A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial 
Creativity, 55 TuL. L. REV. 1 (1980); Hahn, Negotiating Contracts With the Japanese, 14 
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 377 (1982); Pedersen, International Arbitration in Denmark, 14 
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 259 (1982); Rosenn, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 
Brazil, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 498 (1980). 
278. See supra notes 49-76 and accompanying text. 
279. See supra notes 234-53 and accompanying text. 
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apply significant pressure on domestic courts to develop consis-
tent and binding legal principles which best effectuate the contrac-
ting parties' original intentions. 
Domestic application of the U .N. Convention has indicated an 
American receptiveness to enforcement of international arbitra-
tion agreements based upon both the Convention and an indepen-
dent base of foreign policy. Judicial inclination to promote the ef-
ficacy of international commercial arbitration will similarly 
characterize the domestic application of the Inter-American Con-
vention.280 Nevertheless, American businessmen are advised to 
carefully delineate their choice of mechanisms governing dispute 
settlement.281 A modicum of effort can provide a superior method 
for handling foreign commercial disputes.282 A properly con-
structed arbitration clause will effectively bypass the problems 
and ambiguities inherent in disparate foreign legal systems. 283 
Only in this manner can the contracting parties successfully evade 
280. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger has advocated the use of arbitration as a means of 
alleviating the growing pressures upon the traditional legal process. Annual Report on the 
State of the Judiciary by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, American Bar Association, 
Chicago, Ill. (Jan. 24, 1982). 
281. The Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission recommends the follow-
ing arbitration clause for effective settlement of commercial disputes: 
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the 
breach, termination or invalidation thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accor-
dance with the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration 
Commission in effect at the date of this agreement. The arbitral tribunal shall 
decide as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono. 
INTER-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION COMMISSION, RULES OF PROCEDURE 2 (1982). 
282. See generally AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, NEW STRATEGIES FOR 
PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 198 (1971) (discussing impor-
tant regulations governing arbitration in the major global trading nations); De Vries, supra 
note 3, at 61-79 (discussing the desirability, rather than the legal effectiveness, of the ar-
bitration clause in international contracts); M. DOMKE. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION 30 (1968) (outlining the essential provisions of an arbitration clause). 
283. Recent studies have indicated that effective and successful arbitration pro-
ceedings emanate both from a well-drawn arbitration provision and from educated pro-
cedural choices made by the contracting parties. In this respect, "[b]asic questions arise con-
cerning where to arbitrate, which procedures to utilize and how to enforce a resultant ar-
bitration award." Coulson, A New Look at International Commercial Arbitration, 14 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359, 359 (1982). The American Arbitration Association's 1981 survey of 
major U.S. law firms and multinational corporations has revealed that satisfactory awards nor-
mally result in situations where the parties carefully select the arbitrator(s). Additionally, the 
"arbitration procedure, while important, is of secondary significance." Id. Thus, this study 
seems to suggest that even though the Inter-American Convention employs back-up pro-
cedural rules, as delineated by the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission, ex-
ecutives and their attorneys should not underestimate the importance of the arbitrator(s) 
selection process. 
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substantial litigation and the seemingly unpredictable nature of 
foreign judicial review ,284 thereby assuring quicker and more effi-
cient settlement of their commercial disputes. 
Chaim Alexander Levin 
284. Irrespective of the ostensibly uniform domestic application of international com-
mercial arbitration awards, contracting parties almost certainly may evade the quagmire-
like status of conflict of laws problems associated with foreign arbitration by a well-drawn 
arbitration agreement. See generally Croff, The Applicable Law in an International Com-
mercial Arbitration: Is it Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT'L LAW. 613 (1982) 
(discussing the relationship between lex mercatoria and lex Jori). 
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